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ABSTRACT

DISTORTION, DISPARITY, AND DUBIOUS DATA:
THE IMPACT OF ACCOUNTABILITY ON INSTRUCTIONAL PRACTICE
This study examined the impact that state and federal accountability systems have had on
instructional practice in two large Texas school districts by comparing the performance of
students at these schools on individual items from the 2011 Texas Assessment of Knowledge and
Skills (TAKS) and relating performance to item difficulty and the schools' accountability risk as
determined by prior accountability performance.

To make this comparison, schools were

placed into accountability risk groups based on past performance on the No Child Left Behind
Act's (NCLB) Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) accountability instrument. The researcher then
calculated the mean differences between average performance on each item and compared them
against the item difficulty score to determine if the relationship was significant. The relationship
was tested for all groups, both isolating and excluding economically disadvantaged students and
those with limited English proficiency. Inclusion in these groups was based on the coding the
students were assigned in the state's assessment data file. This
comparison used a simple regression analysis performed on SPSS statistical software, version 20.
The findings of the study revealed a statistically significant positive relationship between
the gap in performance for each risk group and the item difficulty level, meaning that as item
difficulty increased the gap between students in the various risk groups grew larger as well.
Based on this study, the researcher questions how effective the federal accountability system is at
determining school achievement.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Background
In January 2002, President Bush signed into law the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001
(NCLB), reauthorizing the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 and ushering in a
new era of educational accountability. Far from a seminal moment, however, NCLB actually
represented a crescendo of sorts–a fait accompli marking the culmination of a gradual shift
toward outcome-based accountability in education that had been gathering momentum since the
issuance nearly two decades earlier of A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform.
The law required all 50 states, as well as Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia (DC),
to develop performance-based accountability systems by 2006. The key element of the system
was its ambitious requirement that states demonstrate that 100 percent of students achieve
proficiency in reading and mathematics by 2014. To ensure compliance, the law predicated Title
I funding on states implementing annual measurable objectives (AMOs) in both mathematics and
reading that would apply to districts, schools, and designated subgroups within the schools that
met prescribed size requirements. States were required to set interim benchmarks to demonstrate
adequate yearly progress (AYP) toward the law’s 100 percent proficiency goals, with schools
and districts failing to achieve AYP subject to a series of escalating sanctions that would
potentially lead to school restructuring requiring all or most of the school's staff to be replaced,
including the school principal.
NCLB as well as the state accountability systems which preceded it and from which it
borrowed many of its provisions, is based on the premise that the accountability system’s
requirements and potential sanctions would act as an incentive for educators to improve
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instruction and thereby increase learning and achievement for students. The acceptance of this
premise was wide-spread even prior to the codification of it into law but has of course grown
under NCLB. More than half of the states now utilize performance criteria on state assessments
as a factor in promotion and/or graduation. Among those states 18 use some form of financial
incentive or reward to teachers and administrators related to state accountability as primarily
determined by standardized assessments. As of 2008, at least 32 state accountability systems,
including Texas’s Academic Excellence Indicator System (AEIS), provide for potential
sanctioning of school staff on the basis of poor student performance (Center on Education
Policy, 2006). Moreover, with the enactment of NCLB, public educators nationwide are subject
to sanctioning provisions of AYP, the federal accountability requirements.
In terms not only of scope but also with regards to impact, accountability mandates dwarf
all other education policy reforms. In fact, more than 90 percent of the nearly 53 million children
attending elementary and secondary schools in the United States are enrolled in public schools
subject to federal accountability under NCLB (School Data Direct, 2009).
Proponents of test-based accountability have long argued that accountability creates an
incentive for students, parents, teachers, and administrators to work harder and forces educators
to focus on identifying struggling students and schools and their educational needs (Bishop &
Mane, 2001; Ravitch, 1996; Stotsky, 2000). In theory, these factors will improve student
performance by raising motivation, increasing parent involvement, and encouraging states and
districts to improve curriculum and pedagogy (Simmons & Resnick, 1993; Spalding, 2000;
Viadero, 1994).
However, as researchers have long noted, major policy initiatives are perceived and
implemented through a variety of highly disparate lenses, and thereby often result in substantial
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unintended consequences. Hence, Deborah Stone (1997) postulates, in Policy Paradox, that
implementation of policy “does not reliably follow economic models of markets and incentives”
(p. 34). Further, complex economic theory has consistently demonstrated that both incentives
and disincentives generally yield unforeseen and typically undesirable distortions. For example,
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) demonstrate that incentive/disincentive devices, “though based
on seemingly objective criteria, incline actors to focus on the most easily observable criteria or
outcomes” (p. 29). Several examples of such distortions may be seen in the general impacts on
school programs of both state and federal accountability systems, including such commonly
raised concerns as narrowing curricula, sample distortion — commonly described as teaching to
the test — along with a disproportionate focus on ensuring that all students attain at least
minimum achievement standards to the detriment of higher-order and/or critical thinking skills.
Moreover, critics such as Koretz (2000) and Linn (2009) note that such accountability policies
have induced districts, schools, and teachers to divert resources from subjects, especially fine
arts, that are not explicit indicators of accountability to focus on areas such as math and reading
that are typically measured directly under such models as well as to neglect students well outside
the margins, namely students deemed probable failures or probable passers, to concentrate on the
most easily attained progress indicators (in the case of education, the so-called bubble students)
where outcomes are in doubt. Not only does such distortion ignore critical aspects of the
curriculum, such as social studies, that are not explicitly measured, but it also disserves both the
most needy and most promising students in our schools. As Padilla (2005) has observed, the
focus educational entities are placing on outcome or numbers-based accountability models such
as the Texas AEIS and the federal AYP provisions of NCLB, has led to a distortion of traditional
educational goals, such as passing an examination rather than mastering a skill, as it is clear that
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the former does not necessarily require the latter. Preparing students to pass the state test
corrupts the institution, distorting the school’s mission “from one of education to one of self
preservation” (Padilla, 2005, p. 256). Achieving this distorted goal often induces educators to
modify instructional practices away from traditional substantive content to what Padilla dubs
“heuristics of test taking,” more commonly referred to as test taking skills (p. 257).
The unique pressures and challenges typically faced by lower-performing schools,
including disproportionate levels of poverty, limited English proficiency, and deficient levels of
parental education, only exacerbate these issues. In fact, even within communities, these
challenges disparately impact some schools and school children more than others. Indeed, such
disparity and distortion can even be observed within individual campuses and classrooms.
Though the debate continues to rage with regard to the promise and peril incumbent with high
stakes testing and accountability models which focus on such testing, evidence is increasingly
clear that such models have significantly impacted and changed the school experience for
American students, especially those who attend schools that face significant and unique
challenges not adequately provided for within the system (Abedi, 2004; Kim & Sunderman,
2005; Tracey, Sunderman, & Orfield, 2005).
It follows, therefore, that the distortions manifested as a result of outcome/numbers-based
accountability will intensify in schools in relationship to the challenges such schools encounter
in their efforts to meet the increasingly demanding provisions of NCLB (the so-called, “Moving
Targets) as well as similarly challenging provisions of state accountability systems.
Despite its widespread scope and impact on education, scant research is available on the
disparate impacts of test-based accountability and its chief component, high-stakes standardized
tests on students, teachers, and campuses/districts facing these challenges to a disproportionate
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degree and the resulting distortions to the educational programs that serve them. However, the
hue and cry from teachers in these institutions has never been louder. Anecdotal accounts of
such distortion are abundant, but the very nature of the problem makes it difficult to reliably
quantify. By contrast, advocates of NCLB and other test-based accountability systems can point
to metrics that reinforce the idea that test-based accountability has led to gains, especially among
minority students. Such growth is not only visible in the frequently derided and oft scorned state
standards and their associated and equally denigrated assessments, but also in the much
celebrated and cited National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). While it is true that
student proficiency levels under NAEP tend to be far below those of state measures, students
have, nevertheless, shown progress in NAEP, especially minority student groups (Whitehurst,
2010).
Critics, meanwhile, are left with a cacophony of disparate voices which rely on the
argument that test-based accountability has induced educators to emphasize accountability
ratings at the expense of students’ education (Koretz, 2005; Padilla, 2005). While such actions
are often defended as the well-meaning result of educators trying to shield students from the
impact of NCLB’s accountability provisions, such as grade retention, policy analysts note that
such concerns ignore the realities of the legislation. To the contrary, NCLB contains liberal
provisions which substantially shield students from this type of direct impact. Moreover, these
actions also call into question educational ethics since the strategies utilized by educational
entities to meet AYP provisions frequently do just the opposite, as when, for example, students
are retained in non-measured grades to minimize accountability exposure (Guggino & Brint,
2010).

5

One frequently cited unintended consequence of test-based accountability is that
educators disproportionately target their educational program to the threshold level (Ravitch,
2010; Rothstein, 2008). Such targeting manifests itself in two distinct but related strategies: (1)
instruction is primarily designed and focused to ensure that marginal students at or near
minimum proficiency successfully pass the assessment utilized by the accountability instrument
(e.g., TAKS in Texas); and (2) curriculum is likewise designed to focus on the minimum skills
necessary to achieve such proficiency at the minimal depth and complexity necessary. In other
words, educators have determined that, from an accountability standpoint at least, there is more
value in directing educational resources to bring the most students possible to the minimal level,
than there is in attempting to maximize achievement for each individual student. Often referred
to by the ironic and wholly inappropriate moniker of “cream-skimming,” such practices result, as
earlier mentioned, in the effective neglect of students at the higher and lower bounds (Finn &
Ravitch, 2007; Rothstein, 2008). Students who are low enough to be deemed unlikely to pass
regardless of interventions may not receive intervention suitable to their needs, if they receive
any at all. This inhibits growth, meaning they are likely to remain below the target level on a
consistent basis. On the other end of the scale, students deemed likely to pass may not be
challenged with curricular rigor sufficient to advance them to the extent of their potential (Jacob,
2005).
This study sought to determine whether evidence could be found to support the idea that
high-stakes accountability results in schools, whether intentionally or unintentionally, adopting
practices that direct resources and time disproportionately toward marginal students and/or at the
minimum skills level. Such practices are difficult to discern from the school performance data
utilized for accountability and which is the subject of media reports and press releases that focus
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attention on passing rates and school ratings but seldom explore whether schools and districts are
being successful in moving students beyond minimum expectation levels, though recent efforts
to measure college readiness do show some promise in this area.
Understandably, as a form of educational triage, the tendency is to worry first about
schools’ abilities to deliver a minimum standard of education and about students acquiring at
least such, and second about moving beyond that minimum standard. However, the long-term
effects of prioritizing certain students over other students (both higher and lower performing)
with a complementary but restrictive curricular model can have long-term and very serious
ramifications not only for these students, but also for the communities where they live and the
competiveness of the nation at large (Dee, 2010).
This study makes several assumptions as to how such distortion may be impacting
instruction as well as deductions regarding what may logically result there from, namely: (1) if
high-stakes accountability is creating a distorted or coercive environment for lesson design and
delivery, it would follow that schools that are more exposed to accountability risks, namely lowand marginal-performing schools in jeopardy of missing AYP, will show more
distortion/coercion; and (2) the greater the accountability risk, particularly the danger of missing
AYP, the greater the impetus toward distortion/coercion will be. By extension, this study
postulates that such distortion/coercion will manifest itself in state assessments at the individual
item level, rather than in percentages of students meeting minimal standards. In other words,
though schools may have similar “passing” rates on the state assessment, schools with less
distortion in theory would have more liberty to focus on higher-level skills and to challenge
higher-performing students to advance. This study posits that these schools will show
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significantly higher performance on the most difficult items of the assessment, to reflect such
liberty, though the schools may have very similar proficiency rates.
Statement of the Problem
NCLB and similar accountability systems are based on the premise that holding schools
accountable for student performance will work as an incentive for schools (and school districts),
as well as teachers and administrators, to improve instructional practices so as to maximize
student achievement. However, recent studies seeking to determine whether this premise is
being realized in practice have been inconclusive, with some studies finding improvements
(Braun, 2004; Carnoy and Loeb, 2002; Hanusheck and Raymond, 2004) while other studies
describe negligible impact on such achievement (Amrein and Berliner, 2002; Nichols, Glass,
Berliner 2006). Carnoy and Loeb (2002) adopted an index (0-5) as defined by the Consortium for
Policy Research in Education (CPRE) to determine the degree of external pressure exerted by the
accountability instruments to which schools and districts were subjected to as a means to
improve student achievement. The index weighs a number of factors such as the application of
statewide standards, the presence of sanctions/rewards linked to assessment performance, and
whether or not grade retention/promotion and/or graduation were linked to such performance.
Carnoy and Loeb (2002) found that the greater the external pressure (deemed strength of the
accountability system), the greater the improvements in student achievement as measured on 4th
and 8th grade mathematics tests. The study also found a positive correlation with regard to high
school retention rates.
Hanushek and Raymond (2003, 2004) also found that students in states that had
implemented stringent accountability measures in the interim between NAEP administrations
showed more improvement than students in states with no accountability system on the
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following NAEP administration. The study looked at students’ NAEP test scale scores in
reading and mathematics. Further, student achievement gains were found not only in the overall
testing cohorts, but in socioeconomic subgroups as well, including African American and
Hispanic groups. However, an analysis of the gap between White students’ performance and that
of African Americans and Hispanic students was mixed, with the gap narrowing slightly between
White and Hispanic students while increasing slightly between White and African American
students.
Other studies, however, have painted a far less encouraging picture as to the impact that
such accountability systems have had on student achievement. For example, studies conducted
by Amrein and Berliner (2002) failed to identify consistent patterns of student achievement
associated with accountability when independent assessments were used to calculate
achievement. Their initial study analyzed assessment data from eighteen states seeking to
quantify the effect of high stakes accountability on student achievement. Amrein and Berliner
concluded that since states can and do manipulate individual assessment criteria and because
state assessments vary widely from state to state, a uniform, independent instrument must be
employed to measure achievement (and improvement, if any). Their study analyzed test results
on the ACT, SAT, NAEP, and AP, assessments, looking for a correlation between stringent
accountability measures and increases in student achievement.
Utilizing the uncertainty principle, the concept that precise simultaneous measurement of
some complementary variables is impossible, Amrein and Berliner came to the conclusion that
there was no clear evidence of improved student learning regardless of whether the students
improved their scores from previous assessments. The researchers argued that even assuming
the ACT, SAT, NAEP, and AP tests are reasonable measures of the states’ curriculum which
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accountability incentives are intended to affect, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that
accountability is driving such improvement, and therefore insufficient evidence to determine that
accountability instruments do in fact have the desire incentive effect. Although year over year
scores on states’ high-stakes tests may show increases, Amrein and Berliner (2002) posit that the
"transfer of learning is not inexorably the underlying correlation to such outcomes as suggested
by accountability policy" (p. 52). In fact based on their work, Amrein and Berliner have
proposed a new social-sciences version of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle: "The more
important that any quantitative social indicator becomes in social decision-making, the more
likely it will be to distort and corrupt the social process it is intended to monitor” (p. 5). Amrein
and Berliner (2002) contend that such distortion, which is supported by “numerous reports of
unintended consequences associated with high-stakes testing policies (increased drop out rates,
teachers and schools cheating on exams, teachers’ defection from the profession . . . ) makes
clear the need for continued study and reform of accountability policies” (p. 2).
A plethora of critics now oppose the use of assessments as the primary metric for
accountability purposes due to a variety of factors ranging from score volatility, assessment
deviation, and the tendency of the practice to compromise instructional practice and thereby
threaten the validity of the very scores upon which the instruments rely (Nichols, Glass, &
Berliner, 2006). Even test measurement specialists, as Ravitch (2010) notes, generally oppose
the use of standardized tests for accountability, citing a 1999 report from the Committee on
Appropriate Test Use of the National Research Council wherein psychometricians warn that
“tests are not infallible” (p. 153). As a leading psychometrician, Robert Linn (2009), has
explained, there are a variety of reasons that students fail tests and “failing results are not
necessarily indicative of the quality or lack thereof present in a school” (p. 198).
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However, Amrien and Berliner’s (2002) work has not gone unchallenged. Critics noted
that the researchers’ initial analysis of achievement trends on the NAEP, for example, wherein
the researchers compared the performance of K-8 and high school students against the national
average and then organized them by state into groups that exhibited either “strong” or “weak”
evidence of increases or decreases related to accountability requirements, and for which the
researchers found no consistent effect related to accountability policy, was flawed because the
study did not include a control group. After adding a control group and correcting what were
viewed as additional method and design flaws, Rosenshine (2003) concluded that average NAEP
increases were indeed greater in states with stringent accountability models than in states with
less stringent models, while nevertheless conceding, after disaggregating data by state, that
stringent accountability policy was “not effective policy in all states” (p. 4).
After Rosenshine’s (2003) analysis, Amrein-Beardsley and Berliner (2003) adapted their
research methods to include a control group but also made adaptations to control for exclusion
rates (i.e., the exclusion of students from NAEP testing based on school officials determination
that the students could not meaningfully participate or could not meaningfully participate without
accommodations not available for NAEP testing – generally learning disabled students and
students with limited English proficiency). Amrein-Beardsley and Berliner (2003) concluded
that the gains Rosenshine (2003) correlated to the presence of strong accountability
requirements, were insignificant when results were controlled for such exclusion, a finding they
argued supported the widely held belief that such accountability systems act more as an incentive
to manipulate testing cohorts (i.e., exclude low performing students from testing) than as an
instructional incentive to improve learning for all students.
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Henry Braun (2004) also studied achievement gains on NAEP for students in relation to
the strength of the relevant accountability system applied and found that when standard error
measurements were included, students in states with strong accountability instruments in place,
did better on math assessments than students in states with weak or no test-based accountability.
However, Braun noted that when cohorts of these students were followed as they progressed
through schools, these gains “largely disappeared” (p. 33), suggesting that any gains related to
accountability pressures are short-lived and potentially the result of enhanced effort by students
on the assessment itself rather than an indication of actual increased achievement or improved
instructional practice.
Clearly, the debate as to the efficacy of accountability systems as an incentive to improve
instructional practice and enhance student achievement remains unsettled. However, it is worth
noting, that while these studies have sought to examine the positive effects (or lack thereof) of
such systems on student achievement, they did not attempt to account for negative unintended
consequences that may have played a role in the data ultimately gathered but for which the
design of the studies was inadequate to measure. In other words, are the unintended, yet
“corrupt” (Jones, Jones, & Hargrove, 2003, p. 158) and “perverse” (Ryan, 2004, p. 39),
consequences of such accountability instruments in fact negatively impacting student
achievement even while data seems to arguably suggest that, at least for some students, the
instruments are positively impacting the instruction they received. Notable, especially, are the
charges that, as suggested by Amrein and Berliner (2003), NCLB has in fact distorted and
corrupted the educational practices it was implemented to monitor. Are educators, in practice,
under serving students as the educators struggle to adapt instructional practices that maximize
performance as defined by the accountability instrument? Have these efforts come at the
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expense of students outside the margins? Have they created an artificial ceiling for all students
as educators seek to widen the breadth of student achievement by compromising the depth?
Research Questions
Bearing in mind the context of the current educational environment and its related focus
on accountability, research into the impact of accountability systems on the processes and
practices of schools and school districts and the extent to which such impact is exacerbated by
external factors such as the unique challenges facing schools and school districts with high
populations of economically disadvantaged, immigrant, and/or limited English proficient
students remains limited. Therefore, this study sought to determine whether test-based
accountability instruments have a disparate impact on instructional practices related to schools’
accountability risk. I posed two fundamental questions about the ways in which schools and
school districts have responded to high-stakes accountability policies:
1.

Does state assessment data support the theory that high stakes accountability
systems encourage educators to disproportionately direct (distort) instructional
practices to minimum skills levels?

2.

Does the distortion of instructional practices, if any, increase subject to the
accountability exposure of schools?

Theoretical Framework
Public school educators face increasing pressure to improve the achievement of all
students. Even assessment advocates such as Black and Wiliam (1998) have long recognized the
potential perils inherent in high-stakes, test-based, accountability. Though opposed to the single,
summative measure utilized by NCLB and most state accountability systems, preferring instead
some system of formative assessment and continuous feedback, they acknowledge that outcome-
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based accountability systems (including NCLB) and their associated requirements have at least
focused educators on outputs instead of inputs, that is, learning instead of instruction. (Black,
Wiliam, et al, 2003). Black and Wiliam promote the argument that outcomes, as a measure of
student learning, are the only effective indicator of educational efficacy. However, as is
increasingly clear as the impacts of such accountability systems become more apparent,
outcomes as measured by a quantitative metric are subject to a variety of distortions which not
only call into question the validity of the ratings issued under such systems, but also negatively
impact student learning, especially for those students most in need.
This research endeavor offers an analysis of organizational decision making in response
to external pressures created by state and federal accountability systems, and the extent to which
disparate challenges faced by some districts, campuses, and teachers distort or alter such
decisions.
Social science researchers building on rational choice and incentive theories borrowed
from economics have closely examined how individuals react to incentives (rewards) and
disincentives (sanctions) and the extent to which such behaviors distort organizational goals. As
economists Laffont and Martimort (2001) note, the use of incentives to promote a desirable
action (in this case improved instructional programs and practices) creates a paradox between
institutional goals and individual goals (p. 393). A key component of incentive theory is a
concept economists refer to as nonverifiability and deals with the processes that an agent
pursuing an incentive utilizes to achieve a measured goal. However, broad public policy goals
such as those typically established in education, for example to improve student learning, are
extremely complex and difficult to measure with direct, quantifiable metrics, resulting in the
establishment of indirect metrics, such as proficiency rates on standardized assessments, which
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tend to corrupt public service (Simon, 1978). According to Rothstein (2008), conventional
measurements of such outputs are “oversimplified and unable to support valid accountability” (p.
5). While an increase in the percentage of students testing “proficient” on standardized
assessments may be an indicator of improved student learning, it could also be an indicator of
several alternate factors, including more motivated students, less rigorous tests, and lowered
proficiency thresholds, which have little to do with improved instructional practices or increased
student learning. Likewise, a decrease or static measure in the percentage of students testing
proficient may or may not indicate something with respect to the efficacy of educational
programs and providers. Moreover, the disincentives created by high-stakes accountability
inevitably lead to goal distortion, wherein achieving the metric becomes the goal irrespective of
the processes employed to attain it.
As Stecher and Kirby (2004) illustrate, outcome-based accountability systems frequently
induce educators to target the metric or distorted goal rather than the broad public policy goal,
resulting in such practices as teaching to the test, cohort manipulation, and disproportionate
curricular focus, to name but a few. Such practices not only call into question the efficacy of
accountability systems to improve educational practices, but also raise questions related to the
validity of improvements reported under such systems.
The basic premise of most state accountability systems as well as the federal system
under NCLB is that incentives, in the form of rewards and/or sanctions will “encourage”
improved practices that will translate into improved educational outcomes through a cycle of
continuous improvement. See Figure 1 below.
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Continuous Improvement Cycle (Adapted)

Figure #1
However, as incentive theory has consistently demonstrated in other fields, especially
health care and governmental services, actors under accountability pressure tend to distort goals
to focus on metrics through practices that do not necessarily, and in fact, rarely support the
broader public policy goals — in this case improved educational practices. As Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1991) have shown in economic models, the greater the “risks” of failure, such as the
challenges in an educational setting, especially input disparity in the form of language,
economic, and mobility issues, “the more likely actors are to distort processes” to meet a
distorted goal, thereby meeting the goal by attaining an indirect metric rather than the broad
policy goal of, for example, improved student learning (p. 34). See Figure 2 below.
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Distorted Processes Model

Figure #2

As illustrated in Figure 2 above, substantial risk of failure (denoted therein as challenges)
may cause actors to subvert rather than address challenges to meeting a metric (in the case of
accountability: student achievement as determined by the rates of students meeting minimum
standards on the state assessment). Economists Laffont and Martimort (2001) have noted goal
distortion as a problem particularly with accountability systems based on narrowly defined
indirect metrics rather than systems which rely on more “holistic evaluative techniques” based
on observation, work product, and other factors which may have influenced performance (p.
292). Intuitively, it would seem, such distortions would only be exacerbated in accountability
systems such as AEIS and AYP that rely disproportionately on the single indicator of test scores.
McNeil (2005) equates such reliance on single indicators to the well-publicized “accounting
debacles” that took place related to the collapse of one-time oil giant Enron (p. 65). She points
out that Enron utilized a single metric indicator (the company’s stock price) to market the
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company’s success. The company’s balance sheets reflected high revenues and profits, thus
driving the price up, while questionable, and as it turns out illegal, accounting practices hid the
company’s massive debt obligations, thereby artificially inflating the company’s net worth.
Similarly, McNeil (2005) criticizes the heavy reliance of the Texas accountability on the state’s
standardized assessment, noting it has led to a bevy of questionable practices such as test drill,
restricted curricula, and targeted exemptions of students.
The Texas accountability system, as Rothstein (2008) points out, makes little adjustment
for so-called risk factors. Though it does disaggregate results by subgroup, overall score
requirements are not adjusted for high numbers of students within risk groups. Therefore,
schools and districts, such as those along the Texas-Mexican border, with high populations of
students in focus groups, including limited English proficient, migrant, and economically
disadvantaged, are disproportionately impacted since these populations constitute a great
majority of their students. Many schools in the Far West Texas ISD, for example, have
economically disadvantaged populations approaching 100 percent, while the district as a whole
most recently reported more than 68 percent of its students as economically disadvantaged and
nearly a third as limited English proficient (Texas Education Agency, Pocket Edition of School
Statistics, FWTISD Supplement, 2007-2008). The federal system is even more onerous, not only
holding schools and school districts to a single AYP criteria for overall performance regardless
of the population of students in focus groups, but also requiring such standard individually for
each and every subgroup category above a minimum population threshold (10 percent of student
population with minimum of 50 students).
These statistics bolster the argument that both the state and federal accountability systems
are inequitable in their treatment of schools and school districts which are demonstrably
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disproportionately challenged to meet accountability requirements under both models (Kim &
Sunderman, 2005; Tracey, Sunderman, & Orfield, 2005). Challenges of this type widely impact
these schools and districts in terms of personnel, program budgets, and curriculum focus.
However, many proponents of test-based accountability continue to insist that the system acts as
an incentive to encourage students, parents, teachers, and administrators to work harder to
identify and remediate struggling students (Whitehurst, 2010). Such advocates believe student
achievement can be improved by raising student motivation, increasing parental involvement,
and encouraging states and districts to improve curriculum and pedagogy. This study employed
quantitative methods to examine student achievement in schools with varying degrees of
accountability risk as a means to determine whether the student achievement gains celebrated by
proponents mask distorted instructional practices that have had a disproportionate impact on the
most needful students and campuses.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to determine (1) whether student performance as measured
on the state assessment evidenced significant differences in performance of students at schools
related to the schools’ level of accountability risk as defined herein, and (2) whether such
differences, if any, reflected the prevailing wisdom related to distortion of educational goals and
practices, specifically the nature of the curriculum that educational practitioners choose to focus
instruction upon as well as the instructional delivery focus related to the target student group. In
other words, as is a common complaint related to accountability: Has the use of standardized
testing led to narrowing of the curriculum and a focus on the most easily attainable skills
delivered at the minimal level to achieve proficiency to thereby achieve as high a possible rate of
students meeting at least minimum proficiency levels, as such levels are typically the focus of
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high stakes accountability systems, including both the AEIS system and the AYP provisions of
NCLB?
Significance of the Study
With NCLB legislation currently stalled as to reauthorization, and as Congress debates
the relative positives and negatives of this legislation, this study is significant in that it sought to
determine whether quantitative evidence from the accountability instrument’s own chief metric
could support the theory often alleged anecdotally and qualitatively that NCLB and similar
accountability instruments have induced educators to distort educational goals and practices in
response to such accountability risks. In addition, the study aimed to determine the extent to
which, if such distortion is indeed prevalent, such use of singular assessment metrics for
accountability are reliable, let alone appropriate measures by which to determine school efficacy,
student achievement, and teacher quality. Though studies by Campbell (1979) and Simon
(1978), discussed in more detail later in this dissertation, suggest that public accountability
systems are difficult to design due to the frequent misalignment of goals and measurement
metrics, it seems unlikely that outcome-based accountability has run its course. Therefore, to the
extent that identifying and understanding how accountability systems relate to broad public
policy goals and how they manifest unforeseen and unintended consequences, may, it is hoped,
mitigate such effects in future systems.
Finally, this study is significant because if, as the model herein suggests, the
accountability system intended to incentivize educators to improve instructional practice is in
fact, acting to inhibit sound instructional practice in an effort to achieve metrics only loosely
aligned to broad policy goals, then in a practical sense, the data (i.e., test scores) used to evaluate
curriculum and instructional practice, as well as to formulate much educational policy, does not
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in fact accurately reflect either student performance or that of the professionals charged with
educating them.
Limitations of the Study
The extent to which findings from this study can be generalized across other student
populations may be limited due to the relative small sample of school performance data analyzed
in the study. In addition, while the methodological approach employed within this study
attempts to mitigate the possibility that differences in student performance observed in relation to
the different risk groups analyzed herein may potentially relate to other factors, including the
lack of homogenous educational practices, approaches, and backgrounds, such factors cannot be
entirely discounted. However, to the extent that student achievement is a function of untold
numbers of factors, not the least of which are nonpersistent factors described later in this
dissertation, the researcher believes the strong relationship between predicted outcomes and
accountability risks make it likely that high degrees of accountability risk are in fact,
contributing to the performance measured herein.
In addition, this study relies on state assessment data, the reliability of which is called
into question within this dissertation, itself. However, as is evidenced in the discussion dealing
with summative and formative assessment, the faults of the data lie principally in their volatility
and verifiability. To this extent, although such data is called into question as a metric for
reliability purposes, its use as a general indicator of student response, especially in large
populations is less volatile and problematic because the study does not seek to determine the
educational performance of any single student, teacher, or even campus based on such snapshot
data, but rather the performance in a broader sense of campus groups on test items relative to
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their position on a continuum of difficulty determined by statewide performance of students on
the individual items.
Finally, it is both ironic and apropos that this study relies on test data to make
conclusions regarding instructional practice. As this study sought to quantify the instructional
impact of accountability through a comparison of the state’s own data, it therefore did not rely on
any direct measure of instructional practice in the classrooms of the schools from which the data
originated. Though the reliability of conclusions drawn from such indirect metrics is a salient
point in the theoretical framework upon which the study is based, this only further serves to
illustrate the varying conclusions that can be drawn from data relevant to the disparate lenses
under which it is examined. Therefore, while the conclusions drawn from the data in this study
may be subject to similar discrepancies, the underlying point that metrics of this nature cannot be
used to reliably evaluate school efficacy, is, nevertheless, strengthened.
Chapter Summary
The federal school accountability system under NCLB is an overwhelming mandate that
impacts hundreds of millions of students across the United States. The legislation, as its title
implies, was designed to encourage educators to focus instructional practice such that
traditionally overlooked groups of students, particularly students who are economically
disadvantaged or who are limited English proficient. However, consistent with Campbell (1979)
and Simon's (1978) theories of performance measurement, and Laffont and Martimort's (2001)
studies involving incentives, many researchers such as Linn (2009) and Rothstein (2008) now
question the premise that accountability has improved or will improve instructional practice in
schools, pointing to conflicting statistics on other measurement instruments, for example, NAEP
scores.
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This chapter provided background information, a statement of the problem,
the theoretical framework that guided the study, the purpose and significance of the
study, the research questions undertaken by the study, and a definition of key terms used in the
study, as well as the study's limitations. In Chapter 2, the researcher will review the literature
related to assessment and accountability, including the legal framework and mandate for
principal leaders to utilize assessment and data to inform instructional practice in schools, the
role of accountability systems as an incentive to improve instructional practice in the public
schools, and the concept of goal distortion as it applies to organizations in general and to schools
in particular, including such commonly criticized practices as narrowing of the curriculum,
teaching to the test, and the impact of test-focused practices on high-risk groups, including
economically disadvantaged students and those who are limited English proficient.
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Chapter 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Introduction
The review of literature is focused on the following areas: the legal framework
underpinning the role of assessment and the use of data to inform instructional practice, the
perceived impact of accountability on instructional practice, the concept of goal distortion in
general and as applied specifically to education, implications for special populations, and finally
requirements under the accountability system.
Legal Framework
In Texas, standards for educator certification for school administrators are contained
within the Texas Administrative Code, Title 19, Part 7, Chapter 241, Rule §241.15. The code
represents the legislative framework that delineates the duties and responsibilities of
administrators related to the instruction of public school students in Texas. The expectation that
school leaders in Texas promote the analysis of student data to adapt and guide instruction is set
forth therein as follows:
I

Learner-Centered Leadership and Campus Culture. A principal is an educational
leader who promotes the success of all students and shapes campus culture by
facilitating the development, articulation, implementation, and stewardship of a
vision of learning that is shared and supported by the school community. At the
campus level, a principal understands, values, and is able to:
(5)

utilize emerging issues, trends, demographic data, knowledge of
systems, campus climate inventories, student learning data, and other
information to develop a campus vision and plan to implement the vision.
(g)

Learner-Centered Curriculum Planning and Development. A
principal is an educational leader who promotes the success of all
students by facilitating the design and implementation of curricula
and strategic plans that enhance teaching and learning; alignment
of curriculum, curriculum resources, and assessment; and the use
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of various forms of assessment to measure student performance.
At the campus level, a principal understands, values, and is able
to:
(1)

(h)

use emerging issues, occupational and economic
trends, demographic data, student learning data,
motivation theory, learning theory, legal
requirements, and other information as a basis for
campus curriculum planning.

Learner-Centered Instructional Leadership and Management. A
principal is an educational leader who promotes the success of all
students by advocating, nurturing, and sustaining a campus culture
and instructional program conducive to student learning and staff
professional growth. At the campus level, a principal understands,
values, and is able to:
(4)

utilize interpretation of formative and summative
data from a comprehensive student assessment
program to develop, support, and improve campus
instructional strategies and goals.

The establishment in schools of processes to analyze student learning data for the purpose of
adjusting instruction is also recognized in school leadership standards set forth by the Interstate
School Leaders Licensure Consortium as follows:
Standard 2
A school administrator is an educational leader who promotes the success of all
students by advocating, nurturing, and sustaining a school culture and instructional
program conducive to student learning and staff professional growth.
Knowledge
The administrator has knowledge and understanding of (in part):


measurement, evaluation, and assessment strategies

As illustrated by the codification of these duties and responsibilities above, the utilization
of state assessment data to inform and adapt instruction is clearly supported by a legal
framework. However, the duties and responsibilities below clearly mandate that administrators
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provide strategies and structures to meet broad educational goals and that such strategies and
structures be developed based on a variety of information sources to meet individual student
learning needs. In Texas Administrative Code, Title 19, Part 7, Chapter 241, Rule §241.15:
(g)

(3)

Learner-Centered Curriculum Planning and Development. A principal is an
educational leader who promotes the success of all students by facilitating the
design and implementation of curricula and strategic plans that enhance teaching
and learning; alignment of curriculum, curriculum resources, and assessment; and
the use of various forms of assessment to measure student performance. At the
campus level, a principal understands, values, and is able to:

implement special campus programs to ensure that all students are provided quality,
flexible instructional programs and services to meet individual student needs.

And in the Interstate School Leaders Licensure Consortium:
Standard 2
Dispositions
The administrator believes in, values, and is committed to (in part):


student learning as the fundamental purpose of schooling



the proposition that all students can learn



professional development as an integral part of school improvement

Performances
The administrator facilitates processes and engages in activities ensuring
that (in part):


professional development promotes a focus on student learning consistent
with the school vision and goals



barriers to student learning are identified, clarified, and addressed



multiple opportunities to learn are available to all students



curriculum decisions are based on research, expertise of teachers, and the
recommendations of learned societies



a variety of sources of information is used to make decisions
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The Impact of Accountability on Instructional Practice
This review of literature will first further examine the concept of goal distortion as a
consequence of standardized test-based high-stakes accountability systems, detailing widely
criticized practices aimed at targeting the test or gerrymandering student samples, and then
analyze key risk factors which disproportionately challenge schools and school districts, notably
socioeconomic factors as well as high populations of English language learners.
Goal Distortion and the Law of Performance Measurement
Social science researchers have long observed that workers behave differently when
monitored for efficiency. As Gillespie (1991) relates, early industrial studies conducted in the
early 1920s at the General Electric factory first uncovered this previously unknown
phenomenon. As part of a scientific management approach, researchers Elton Mayo and Fritz
Roethlisberger, through what later became known as the Hawthorne Investigation at Western
Electric Company, sought to determine the optimal illumination at General Electric plants for
workers to be the most productive. They were surprised to observe that workers at the
Hawthorne plant increased production both at dimmer and brighter levels of illumination. After
conducting interviews with the workers, Mayo and Roethlisberger determined that workers had
adjusted their performance as a consequence of the evaluation.
In the case of the Hawthorne experiments, monitoring had a positive unintended
consequence. However, the Hawthorne workers, as Rothstein (2008) notes had no personal stake
in the results of the study. No incentives were offered for increased production and no sanctions
were threatened for decreased production, though one might assume that some workers feared
the study results might be used to criticize their job performance. For more overt performance
measurement models, however, such assumptions are not necessary. Workers in many
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occupations, both public and private, are acutely aware of performance monitoring systems as
well as the incentives and disincentives related to measurement outcomes.
A half century later, Northwestern University social scientist Donald Campbell (1979)
determined that accountability and control systems “which included elements of possible
rewards or punishments created incentives for workers to utilize deception and fraud to appear
more competent than they actually were” (p. 43). Campbell articulated his findings in a theory
which came to be called the law of performance measurement:
The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-making, the more
subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort
and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor. (p. 43)
Campbell, as well as Carnegie-Mellon University professor Herbert A. Simon (1978), defined
two fissures which have weakened the foundation upon which public accountability policy has
been constructed: the failed attempt to measure complex public goals with a simple quantifiable
metric; and the corruption and fraud which have been engendered by attempts to meet such goal.
Even as politicians and policy makers debate the relative merits and deficiencies of
NCLB as part of the effort to reauthorize the act, critics assail the attempt with countless
examples of such fraud and corruption, running the gamut from the widespread perception that
teachers “teach to the test” to more isolated incidents, or so it is thought, of blatant cheating and
outright fraud (Jones, Jones, & Hargrove, 2003, Ryan, 2004). Nevertheless, with continued
strong public support for some type of accountability system for education, lawmakers are
resolutely, albeit possibly futilely, engaged in efforts to draft changes to the law that will address
its weaknesses (Education Trust, 2011). In doing so, Rothstein (2008) notes three key obstacles
that must be overcome:
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(1) Oversimplified outcome measures (i.e., the disproportionate reliance on a single
indicator [test score] to determine progress, resulting in goal distortion and manifest process
distortion including excessive test prep activities, narrowed curriculum, questionable
exemptions, and marginalizing of students at the high and low end; and
(2) Insufficient or absent inputs adjustment structures to account for disparate populations
among schools and incumbent disparate impact of the accountability provisions (e.g., to provide
a more equitable accountability comparison for schools with high levels of student populations at
risk of failure as opposed to those with low populations of such students); and
(3) Untrustworthy statistics derived from assessments subject to probable sampling error
associated with teaching to the test as well as the relatively small student cohorts for subgroups
and subsequently large confidence intervals in score reporting that further undermine the
system’s credibility. (p. 6)
Educators have been harshly criticized for seeming to put personal professional goals
before student learning, but as Rothstein demonstrates, goal distortion is a phenomenon readily
observable in any system, public or private, where incentives and/or disincentives are employed
to effect outcomes defined by a simple, indirect metric. In some respect, nevertheless, such
criticisms have merit in so much as they involve educators readily adopting practices which they
themselves denigrate in pursuit of higher test scores and satisfactory accountability ratings.
However, such incongruence, if in fact such practices are being employed on a large scale, only
underscores the strong influence that accountability incentives may be exerting on instructional
practitioners.
Such pressures, critics argue, are especially strong in schools and school districts which
face disparate levels of challenge. Rippberger and Staudt (2003) note, for example, that while
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the numbers of students in the United States for whom English is not the first language is
dramatically increasing in the nation at large, border states, and especially border communities,
face a far greater challenge than schools, districts, and even states which may have student
subgroup populations “often too small to be subject to accountability measures” (p. 126). They
go on to detail how in schools confronted with such disparate challenges “preparation for tests
tends to subvert experience-based learning” and observed the propensity for pencil-paper test
drills over participatory learning (p. 129).
Prevalence of Goal Distortion in the Other Sectors
Goal distortion is not unique to educational accountability systems. Long before the
passage of NCLB, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) first identified the impact of incentives on
parties to contracts in the economic sector. As Rothstein (2008) fully details, such distortion has
been a predictable occurrence whenever incentives are insufficiently related to determinate
metrics and has been widely observed in medical and legal practice as well as governmental
services. Such distortion as well as often mismeasurement of outputs and failure to adjust risk
according to inputs has encouraged practitioners to adversely redirect effort. For example,
Rothstein details how an accountability model designed to assess physician performance related
to heart surgery patients led to poorer cardiac care for those patients most in need. Designed to
inform patients of the best surgery centers and to encourage improvements in practice, the
system which used a single, indirect metric (mortality rates) encouraged doctors to treat the
riskiest patients (also presumably the most needy) with conservative approaches such as drug
therapy that delayed what often turned out to be necessary surgery.
In another example, Rothstein describes the evaluation of government unemployment
counselors under a system that very heavily weighed the number of successful placements in
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jobs. Again, goal distortion resulted as meeting the metric became the primary goal of
counselors who adopted processes that ironically tended to exclude the most needy applicants.
Faced with sharp pressure to maximize the placement of referrals, counselors focused their
efforts on highly skilled workers (often the most recent, short-term unemployed) and avoided
referring low skilled, long-term unemployed applicants who were less likely to be hired, though
the applicants who had been unemployed for longer times were clearly in the most need. This
practice is an example of what economists refer to as cream skimming and Rothstein relates it to
the targeting of so called bubble students who are the easiest to move into the proficient realm, at
the expense of lowest performing students who are deemed to have little or no chance of passing
a test but who are clearly in the most need.
In a Rand study, Stecher and Kirby (2004) note additional examples of goal distortion in
private enterprise and add an additional caution, explaining that many of the failed accountability
models relied on insufficient numbers of indicators which were, nevertheless, “far more
numerous than the indicators used for most educational accountability systems” (p. 12).
As educators throughout the nation continue to struggle with accountability under NCLB
and state systems, it is important that the laws that focus on risk subgroups be reformed rather
than eliminated. For too long, long before accountability systems created the distortions
described herein, difficult to educate children, indeed the most needy of our students, have been
passively discriminated against through systems that overlooked poor performance in preference
of an efficient, scientific management approach, which shuffled students through the system with
little regard to their educational progress.
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Impact on Schools and Districts with High Defined Subgroup Populations
As noted earlier in this proposal, Texas’s accountability system, the Academic
Excellence Indicator System (AEIS), has long held schools accountable for performance of their
English language learners. However standards for which students would be tested for
accountability purposes have vacillated over the years with exemption periods ranging from one
to three years before students must be tested for accountability. Additionally, until recently,
AEIS, though desegregating data by subgroup (including Limited English Proficient [LEP]), did
not set performance standards for individual subgroups as did the AYP component of NCLB,
instead relying on these students’ presence in the “all students” group as an indicator of
academic proficiency. Though at first glance, such policy appears favorable to schools
(especially those struggling to meet federal AYP requirements for each subgroup), its structure
fails to adjust for the high risk levels of schools with high populations of English language
learners. Current AEIS provisions now require separate evaluation of subgroups with a student
population of at least 30 students, provided the student group accounts for at least ten percent of
the all student population and of subgroups of 50 or more regardless of the percentage of the
overall student group (2011 Accountability Manual, p. 53). While these adjustments have made
accountability exposure somewhat more equitable, they still do not adjust for the
disproportionate exposure to which schools with high populations of students in defined
subgroups are subjected.
Title III of NCLB, in contrast, holds states accountable for meeting the same
accountability requirements for defined subgroups, including LEP students, which meet specific
criteria as measured by state summative assessments based on specific academic content
standards as well as for progress toward English proficiency. Though at its most drastic stages,
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the accountability system can impose harsh sanctions, including loss of federal funding, for
failure to meet established proficiency standards, schools in the early stages of AYP sanctions in
fact receive additional funding to assist with the remediation of students, though the funds come
with a bevy of strings attached. However, continued failure to achieve standards can result in the
loss of federal funding and reassignment of school personnel, among other sanctions (NCLB
Title III, Subpart 2, Sec. 3122).
While neither state nor federal legislation dictates the adoption of specific educational
programs for students belonging to defined focus groups, NCLB does require that the
educational programs that districts select be designed upon sound, research-based practices and
established educational theory, provide trained personnel with appropriate instructional
materials, and include a reliable evaluation process (Lessow-Hurley, 2003).
For example, research has shown that LEP students achieve higher levels of academic
success when quality instruction is provided in both English and their native language (Bailey &
Butler, 2003). Learning is further facilitated by instruction that incorporates elements of both the
students’ native culture as well as learning about the dominant culture and others. Conversely,
students immersed in an unknown language and culture struggle academically when schools
pressure them to abandon their native language and culture (Cummins, 1995).
According to the California State Department of Education, LEP students programs
should observe the following framework:
•

instruction and support in the student’s primary language

•

instruction for English language development

•

sheltered academic content, and

•

multicultural representative curriculum
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Assessment of learning should measure LEP students’ growth in each aspect of the
framework. Assessments should be free of bias and be valid and reliable. Results should be
analyzed and used to adjust instruction to best support students’ progress toward their goals
(Freeman & Freeman, 1998).
Hence, studies indicate that effective bilingual education programs promote high
academic achievement for LEP students (Thomas & Collier, 1997). With a hot debate currently
raging across the nation related to immigration, many citizens in the United States oppose
bilingual instructional programs (Reyhner & Singh, 2010). For example, voters in California,
Arizona and Massachusetts, have recently passed referendums that severely limit, if not
effectively eliminate, most bilingual programs in favor of structured English immersion where
LEP students receive all instruction in English. Though key provisions of these laws are under
court review, the mood of the country reflects a growing dissatisfaction with bilingual programs.
Even the names of national agencies charged to oversee instructional programs in this area are
being revised to reflect the changing political climate. For example, the Office of Bilingual
Education and Minority Language Affairs (OBEMLA) is now called the Office of English
Language Acquisition, Language Enhancement, and Academic Achievement for Limited English
Proficient Students (OELA). Likewise, the National Clearinghouse for Bilingual Education is
now the National Clearinghouse for English Language Acquisition & Language Instruction
Educational Programs.
Although NCLB does not prohibit native language instruction for immigrant students, the
current focus of education for LEP students clearly emphasizes English language teaching over
providing access to content or literacy in students’ primary language. Unfortunately, while
NCLB permits testing in students’ primary language, most states do not provide for such testing
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(or, as in the case of Texas, provide limited opportunities for native language testing) (Bratt &
Sunderman, 2005).
Moreover, development of reliable and valid assessments (in English) for LEP
populations poses special problems for test developers who must accurately document LEP
students’ academic progress despite their limited English proficiency, cultural disconnects and
lack of opportunity to learn the material being tested. Too often, academic assessments of LEP
students are, practically speaking, measures of students’ English language abilities measured by
their comprehension of the questions, rather than their purported level of knowledge of the
content area assessed. Thus, as noted throughout this proposal, decisions made by teachers and
administrators based on the state scores of LEP students’ on standardized tests, run the risk of
distorting educational processes as well as the garnering inappropriate, inequitable judgments.
In a 2003 position paper related to the testing of LEP students, the professional
organization Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages (TESOL) held that:
[i]nasmuch as [standardized] tests measure content in combination with linguistic
abilities, English language learners are at a distinct disadvantage that is difficult to
accommodate. Further, cultural differences and limitations concerning opportunity to
learn can lead to unfair interpretations of low test scores and assessment
discrimination…[S]ince high English proficiency is a prerequisite for success on
high-stakes tests, such assessments are not appropriate for English language learners
and often do more harm than good. (p. 3)
Likewise other professional organizations, including the American Educational Research
Association, the American Psychological Association and the National Council on Measurement
in Education also caution against decision-making based on the scores of English Language
Learners on standardized tests:
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…test norms based on native speakers of English either should not be used with
individuals whose first language is not English or such individuals’ test results should be
interpreted as reflecting in part current level of English proficiency rather than ability,
potential, aptitude or personality characteristics or symptomatology. (Standards for
Educational and Psychological Testing, 1999, p. 91)
On the other hand, proponents of standardized testing (Whitehurst, 2010) maintain that
assessments can inform individual students as well as their teachers and parents regarding their
academic achievement relative to other students as well as identify groups of students who are
struggling so as to help schools and districts understand the fundamental strengths and
weaknesses of their students. However, even strong proponents of standardized tests
acknowledge the limitations of assessment scores and caution that such scores should be only
one factor among many that educators use to inform instruction (Farr & Trumbull, 1997).
Thus, the use of a single test score to determine a student’s level of proficiency,
educational placement, or other important consequence, is considered ‘high-stakes.’ The highstakes nature of accountability under NCLB has been found to strongly effect the educational
environment in U.S. schools (Wright, 2002). As described earlier, American schools are
rewarded or sanctioned based on the performance of their students on such assessments in
accordance to AYP proficiency requirements. Researchers have documented that lowperforming schools have narrowed their curriculum, and limited, excluded, or de-emphasized
subjects that will not be tested (McNeil, 2000). As schools struggle to demonstrate proficiency,
students in low-performing schools are subjected to hours of monotonous test prep.
Ironically, for legislation designed at least in part to address educational gaps between
White students and minority and economically disadvantaged students, the impact of the highstakes accountability measures pursuant to NCLB has been particularly troubling for students in
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these socioeconomic focus groups, including LEP students, migrant students, and economically
disadvantaged students. Schools with high populations of these groups are disproportionately
exposed and not surprisingly then disproportionally represented in the low-performing categories
of both the state and federal accountability systems (Routledge, 2003).
Given that subgroup performance is a vital cog in the NCLB legislation and the plank on
which many educational entities are most challenged when it comes to meeting AYP standards,
it is useful to examine the makeup of the accountability system, particularly as it pertains to
subgroup representation and expectation, and also to look at some of the troubling aspects of the
instrument itself that relate to its reliability as a measure of educational achievement.
Measuring Up Under NCLB Federal AYP Provisions and Guidelines
As the premise of this study postulates that the high-stakes accountability provisions of
NCLB and other stringent accountability systems, including especially Texas’s AEIS as pertains
to this study, have distorted instructional practice in American public schools, it is useful to
carefully examine the provisions of the accountability instrument so as to better gauge the
accountability pressures that schools are subjected to and which may result in said instructional
distortion, especially with reference to subgroup provisions and the determination of proficiency
both for focus subgroup and all students groups.
Under NCLB four types of student subgroups are defined which include students from
racial/ethnic groups (American Indian, Asian, Hispanic, African American, and White), students
identified as Limited English Proficient, students with disabilities, and students identified as
Economically Disadvantaged (typically determined by eligibility for the Federal Free and
Reduced Lunch Program). NCLB mandates that schools meet AMOs (Annual Measurement
Objectives) in all subgroups where there is a numerically significant (i.e., statistically reliable
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sample population size) in mathematics and reading and that 95 percent of all students, as well as
95 percent of each qualifying subgroup, participate in testing in order for a school or school
district to meet federal AYP requirements (2011 Adequate Yearly Progress Guide).
Under NCLB (20 USC 6311 (b)(2)(C)(V)(II), however, AYP is not required when
student populations in a defined subgroup are “insufficient to yield statistically reliable
information or the results would reveal personally identifiable information about an individual
student.” However, NCLB gives states broad leeway to determine what qualifies as a
statistically reliable student subgroup (Erpenbach, Forte-Fast, & Potts, 2003). Thus states have
broad discretion to determine the minimum number of students that a school must have in a
subgroup to trigger NCLB subgroup reporting and tracking provisions as well as AYP subgroup
performance requirements. Current NCLB subgroup requirements for AYP purposes range from
5 (Maryland) to 60 (Kentucky), with the mode being 40. In Texas, for example a subgroup must
be at least 50 members and comprise at least 10 percent of all students or at least 200 members
regardless of percentage to be measured for AYP purposes (compared to 30 members/10 percent
or 50 members for the state system) while in California schools must have at least 50 students in
a subgroup and comprise at least 15 percent of all students with subgroups of 100 or more
evaluated regardless of their percentage of all students. Groups not meeting minimum size
requirements are not counted separately for accountability purposes.
Thus, provisions of accountability systems exclude to various degrees students in focus
groups. For example, in 2006, nearly two million students from defined subgroups were
excluded from AYP calculation under the various state standards for minimum size. Likewise,
while proficiency standards under NCLB continue to rise (the “moving targets”), consistent with
the 100 percent proficiency goal of the program, nearly half the states (23) have increased the
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minimum size requirements to include subgroups for AYP calculation since 2004, while no
states had decreased the size (Chudowsky & Chudowsky, 2005).
The clear implication is, of course, that these changes to state accountability provisions
are made to facilitate more schools successfully meeting AYP requirements, a theory supported
by several studies which have shown that, in general, the percentage of a state’s schools that
meet AYP increases as the minimum subgroup size increases (Porter, Linn & Trimble, 2005;
Simpson, Gong & Marion, 2006).
Separate and Unequal: Moving Targets and an Unattainable Goal
As noted earlier, student achievement, or lack thereof, as pertains to the AYP provisions
of NCLB and other high-stakes accountability instruments, is measured by the percentage of
students meeting proficiency standards on the state’s summative assessment and whether or not
the percentage meets the instrument’s Annual Measureable Objectives (“AMOs”), which specify
the minimum percentages of students who must perform at or above the state’s proficiency level
or “cut score” for both reading and mathematics (NCLB, PL-107-110, Title II, Part A, Subpart 4,
section 2141)..
NCLB critics, including Clarke (2007) and Cohen and Moffitt (2009) have long pointed
to validity concerns with AYP accountability arising from the fact that the instrument relies on
the individual states’ independently developed and widely variable state assessments, developed
from equally disparate and inconsistent state standards. Further complicating the potential for
discrepancy, states enjoy autonomy for determining what level of performance constitutes
proficiency, meaning states are allowed to set their own cut points for passing. This results in
assessments of different rigor and substance being evaluated differently from state to state.
Based on a comparison of state standards and the performance of states on the NAEP test,
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researchers Peterson and Hess (2006) concluded that what constitutes a proficient student varies
widely from state to state. Based on this analysis they concluded that a primary reason some
states exhibit high proficiency rates relates to the relative weakness of the state’s proficiency
standards and vise-versa.
While it may be tempting to dismiss talk of standards discrepancy between states as mere
academic rivalry, the differences between what constitutes proficient in one state compared to
another are far from trivial. In a 2003 study, researchers at the National Center for Education
Statistics compared the state proficiency levels of campuses with the NAEP performance for the
same campuses as a means of correlating the state standards to the NAEP. McLaughlin et al.
(2008) determined that equivalent NAEP performance varied significantly for states’ proficient
level students, estimating that in some cases as much as 20 percent of one state’s proficient
students would not have scored at the proficient level on another state’s summative assessment.
Likewise, differences in state AMOs are often far greater than most would assume,
despite the fact that all states, theoretically, are subject to the same ambitious, and many would
argue unrealistic, broad NCLB goal of 100 percent proficiency by 2014. Under NCLB
provisions, states must establish yearly AMOs building toward the 100 percent goal. Though
NCLB does mandate that intermediate goals remain fixed for no longer than three years, states
may choose how often to adjust the scores (annually, biannually, or every three years), resulting
in a mish mash of growth trajectories and requirements, further adding to the inequity of the
system for schools in different states. Porter, Linn and Trimble (2005) identified four basic
trajectories types pertaining to intermediate AMOs: (1) straight line, with consistent annual
increase; (2) stair-step with consistent increases every three years; (3) front-loaded, with large
increases in early years, and (4) back-loaded, with the larger increases delayed until later years.
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While some states set the intermediate AMOs, often referred to as the “Moving Targets,” at
equal intervals of growth (e.g., Florida), nearly half of all states elected to back-load larger score
gain requirements to later years, probably in hope that the goal would be moderated in the
subsequent reauthorization of NCLB.
As 2014 rapidly approaches, and with projections that more than 90 percent of the
schools in some states will miss AYP over the next three years (Wiley, Mathis, and Garcia,
2005), the back-loaded approach may prove itself prudent. In fact, President Barak Obama has
now decided to issue by executive order, waivers that relieve schools of these AYP provisions
under certain guidelines. However, it is unclear how the waivers will work with respect to the
law as congress continues to work on its reauthorization. Nevertheless, currently, most
states/districts are still required to meet established AMOs. Just how disparate the impact of the
AMO provisions of NCLB are, even discounting previously described discrepancies in the state
assessments themselves, their passing thresholds, and the standards upon which they are based, is
evident through an examination of the initial AMOs set by states in 2002. The initial AMOs (the
starting point for achievement growth required under AYP) were established based on the larger
of the percentage of students at the proficient level in a state’s lowest achieving subgroup or in
schools at the 20th percentile in the state (calculated based on enrollment, with schools ranked
based on the percentage of students rated proficient or above). Such criterion resulted in some
states setting initial AYP AMOs as low as 7 percent compared to 75 percent on the same
subject/grade level in other states. In other words schools in one state where as few as 7 percent
of students achieved proficiency on a state assessment might be determined to meet AYP for that
subject/grade level, while schools in another state where up to 74 percent of students achieved
proficient ratings might be deemed to have “missed AYP.”
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In its current state, NCLB’s accountability ratings bear little if any resemblance to what is
actually taking place in America’s schools. An instrument that relies on inconsistent inputs,
interpreted and applied inconsistently, against inconsistent benchmarks cannot pretend to reliably
compare the educational efficacy of schools. Add on top of these problems an end goal that most
observers agree is unattainable, though laudable. As Rebell and Wolff (2008) have noted, the
100 percent proficiency rate is far from mere motivational diatribe, being the legal mandate that
underpins NCLB’s accountability structure—a mandate the authors contend has "never been
achieved in history" and the feasibility of which "has never been demonstrated" (p. 5). The
authors cite Linn’s (2004) findings that in order to achieve such an ambitious target, students in
some subject/grade level (e.g., 4th grade math) would have to progress at a rate nearly 16 times
the national average over the period 1998 to 2003. Though lauding NCLB’s attempt at ensuring
that the educational needs of all students are addressed, the authors add that the unempirical goal
of 100 percent proficiency is not only irrational, but in the sense that it will soon subject
thousands of schools around the country to a “failing” rating and the problems that accompany
such identification, it is “causing considerable harm” (p. 6)
Safe Harbor, Confidence Intervals, and Projected Growth
Besides allowing the states broad authority to set standards, design assessments, set cut
points and proficiency ratings, many states continue to struggle to meet AYP requirements,
especially as the Moving Targets increase over time, since NCLB designates a series of
increasingly-severe sanctions for schools that miss AYP. Such sanctions take affect based on the
number of consecutive years schools miss AYP, however, the legislation seeks to soften the
landing, so to speak, by allowing a variety of exceptions to the base-line AMO requirements.
The most well-known of these exceptions is commonly referred to as “safe harbor,” which

42

allows for schools that miss AYP to be deemed to meet AYP guidelines provided they show
sufficient progress toward meeting the AMO goals within ten years, projecting the same growth
rate, provided certain other conditions for graduation and/or attendance rates are also met.
States may also choose to use confidence intervals (sometimes known as “margin of
error”) in order to determine whether schools meet an AMO. This provision allows a school that
scores below a certain AMO, whether at the “all students” or a subgroup level, to be deemed to
meet AYP provided its performance falls within the confidence interval surrounding a specific
proficiency goal. States may even use confidence intervals to determine which schools meet
AYP’s safe harbor provision, thus allowing an exception to meet an exception. As the pressure
mounts for states to meet their own Moving Targets, more and more of them have adopted the
use of confidence intervals to calculate AYP. By 2003, more than half of all states (31) had
already adopted the use of confidence intervals. By 2009, that number had ballooned to 45 states.
A confidence interval is basically a statistical measure of how a result might vary were a
given population to be re-sampled. Confidence intervals basically attempt to account for
sampling error, such as mitigating the effects of distracted students, which may occur during
testing. In this case, the greater the confidence required, the greater the confidence interval will
be. States, such as Arizona, which demand a greater confidence level (99%) are actually more
lenient because this creates a larger confidence interval necessary for achieving such confidence
than the typical 95 percent confidence level. However, even assuming a 95 percent confidence
level is calculated for a given school’s (Sample Campus) proficiency rate (e.g., 65%) resulting
in a confidence interval of plus or minus 6 points, means that Sample Campus could meet an
AMO of up to 71 percent (the school’s actual performance, plus or minus 6 points). As Rogosa
(2003) has argued, however, the very concept of confidence intervals is counterintuitive to a

43

proficiency requirement, because in the case of the Sample Campus described above, the
school’s so-called “real” proficiency rate is equally likely to be six points less its actual score
(59%) as it is to be six points greater (71%).
However, for purposes of AYP sampling error is always calculated to benefit the target
campus. Further as Cronin, et al (2009) have contended, the notion of sampling error is
incongruent with the realities of testing under NCLB, pointing out that sampling error as applied
to, for example, opinion polls, is normally employed to account for the relatively small sample of
an overall population that is actually sampled and from which assumptions are based. However,
under NCLB schools must test at least 95 percent of their students, meaning that the overall
population, or nearly so, is in fact sampled, clearly outside the scope of the most common
justification of the use of confidence intervals. Supporters of such intervals argue instead that
the confidence intervals are necessary because the sampling represents a snapshot of student
performance at an isolated time. However, as the researchers argue, “under such a broad
application, no number could ever be seen as determinative for any reason” (Cronin, 2009, p.
16). Imagine, they ask, if election results were required to meet confidence level parameters
because the election is a sample of public opinion on an isolated date.
In addition to safe harbor and confidence intervals, fifteen states either utilize or have
utilized a growth projection model (Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and
Texas) which allows the states to count as proficient students who do not currently meet
proficient levels based on their assessment results but who are projected to meet proficiency
levels at a future testing date, based on a complex model that looks at student growth over time
and historical school performance. An analysis by the National Opinion Research Center found
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that use of the projection model in these states allowed an average of 9 percent more campuses to
meet AYP provisions than would have without the model (Hoffer, et al, 2011). Depending on
how the growth models were formulated, there was wide variation in how much the growth
models aided states in meeting AYP, with some improving only a small percentage while others
(e.g., Ohio) improved their numbers of campuses meeting AYP by more than a third (34
percent). However, the study noted that preliminary reviews as to the accuracy of such
projections show that under the best projection models slightly more than 20 percent of students
projected proficient at a future date remained below proficient levels at the target date, while the
accuracy of most projection models hovered around 50 percent. Texas has recently discontinued
use of its growth model, the Texas Projection Measure (“TPM”) after state education agency
officials acknowledged that the measure incorrectly projected proficiency as much as 50 percent
of the time depending on the assessment, grade level, and subject area (Thevenot, 2010).
However, the TPM was utilized to determine accountability for several years in Texas and
similar measures continue to be utilized in other states. These projection measures are used in
conjunction with both safe harbor and confidence interval exceptions, meaning in effect, a school
could potentially use a growth model to count students who were not proficient as proficient in
order to move within the confidence interval of a safe harbor provision. In essence, this would
build a three-tiered ladder of exceptions, although it is clear that many of the students in the
growth model will not attain proficiency as projected, and although the confidence intervals are
deeply flawed as described earlier in this section.
Notwithstanding these problems, the fact that only fifteen states use growth models
means that students and schools in the other 35 states who are being measured under the same
instrument may in fact demonstrate vastly different performance levels than their schools’
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accountability ratings might suggest. The growth models only add to the inconsistency by which
schools and school districts are evaluated under the federal accountability measure of AYP.
Score Volatility and Noisy Data
Prior to NCLB’s implementation, critics of accountability systems dependant on singlescore results from large scale standardized state assessments were already voicing concerns that
metrics collected from such assessments were compromised and thus unreliable for determining
school efficacy due to the high degree of score volatility unrelated to persistent (i.e., policy or
instructional) factors. In one study of score volatility, Kane and Staiger (2002) of the Brookings
Institution, found that, depending on the size of the school, between 70 and 80 percent of score
volatility was the result of non-persistent factors (e.g., some type of distraction on test day) rather
than persistent factors (e.g., a new teacher, teaching approach, educational program, etc.). The
study results suggest, therefore, that gains/losses posted by schools year over year are much more
likely to reflect chance factors rather than systemic, duplicable educational reform (Kane &
Staiger, 2002).
Kane and Staiger's (2002) study tracked the assessment performance of several hundred
North Carolina elementary students over a multi-year period and compared variability in their
scores from the standard mean at both the school and state levels. The authors note that a
substantial amount of variability can be explained as sampling error. The authors further explain
that this is especially prevalent given the typically small cohorts of elementary students at a
particular grade at any given school (e.g., North Carolina schools averaged about 65 students per
grade level cohort) and argue that much variability potentially exists in the sample simply due to
the fact that the students in the sample are different (Kane & Staiger, 2002). The authors project
that in schools which are particularly heterogeneous, such variability will likely be much greater.
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The authors then compare this to variability at the state level which theoretically should be much
smaller due to the much larger sample. However, data indicates that the state-level variation is
nearly as large, consistent with the idea that most variation is due to outside factors and that only
between 12 and 16 percent of variability is due to empirical differences in schools.
The authors note also that states’ efforts to address preexisting factors in the form of
value-added measures display similar, and in fact exasperated trends. Again, the variability in
score gains for students within a particular school was only slightly larger than the variability
overall, indicating again that such gains are mostly explained by outside factors beyond a
school’s control such as outside distractions or weather. This conclusion is supported by data
from North Carolina that ranked the top ten improving schools each year for a decade with only
nine (9) out of 101 schools ranked (one year two schools tied for 10th) appearing twice and only
one school appearing three times. In other words, schools had trouble repeating performance
gains because, following the author’s hypothesis, such gains likely resulted from chance rather
than actual differences in how the schools delivered instruction. As an anecdotal example, the
authors noted a Massachusetts example where a district was lauded for remarkable gains in its
10th grade scores with extensive newspaper coverage of policy and instructional changes the
district had implemented. Further study, however, revealed that the district had tested only 26
tenth grade students and comparable variability could be found by randomly sampling any 26
students across the state (Kane & Staiger, 2002).
Linn and Haug (2002) conducted a similar study on Colorado students tracking the
percentage of students who achieved the proficient or advanced level year over year. Linn and
Haug (2002) found that student performance for a given year/test was strongly linked to that
student’s performance the previous year regardless of school or teacher. The study revealed that
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such trends were true across cohorts as well. For example, the performance of a cohort of
students was strongly linked to that group’s previous year’s performance regardless of
teacher/school placement. The authors also noted, likewise, that volatility in change scores from
year to year at campuses. That is, the instability of changes from year to year, with schools
showing strong gains significantly more likely to show smaller gains or even declines the
following year, and school showing declines one year much more likely to post increases the
following year, all of which seems to argue against the idea that such gains/losses reflect school
instructional practices. The Colorado data shows substantial between school variability as would
be expected with regards to raw scores but the within school variability remains consistent and
highly correlated to previous years scores. In other words, cohorts of students advance through
schools along very predictable performance paths which do not show much variation as a result
of educational programs or practices. Similar to the findings of Kane and Staiger (2002), Linn
and Haug (2002) conclude that the use of successive cohorts’ performance on standardize
assessments is an unreliable metric for determining school, district, or teacher efficacy due to the
volatility of non-persistent factors (Linn and Haug call this “noise”) to which such results are
highly susceptible.
Chapter Summary
This chapter reviewed the literature related to the legal framework by which Texas
administrators are required to utilize data from state assessments to inform instruction, as a
discussion of the impact of federal accountability on instructional practice. The concept of goal
distortion was introduced as related to both educational organizations and in other sectors, and
examples were covered from other sectors. The researcher also presented literature related to the
accountability system's impact on schools with large populations of defined subgroups subject to
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the subgroup provisions of AYP. Finally, the chapter provided information about the various
disparate requirements under NCLB as well as research that calls into question the validity of the
test scores themselves.
In the following chapter, the researcher will discuss the methodology used in the study,
including how participants were selected, defined in risk group categories, and tested for
differences in item level performance on the 2011 administration of TAKS reading and math.
Information about the simple linear regression test performed with SPSS statistical software is
also provided.
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Chapter 3
METHODOLOGY
This chapter will provide a brief overview of the study, including a review of the purpose
of the study, a restatement of the research questions, as well as an explanation of why the
researcher chose the investigative model that was utilized. The chapter describes any ethical
considerations that were important to the study, as well as a description of how the subjects were
chosen and assigned to risk groups. Finally the research design and plan for data analysis is
described.
Overview
The purpose of the study was to determine whether evidence could be extracted from the
results of state standardized tests which supports the theory that test-based high-stakes accountability
models, specifically the federal AYP provisions of NCLB, have negatively impacted or distorted
instructional practices by inducing schools to target curriculum and focus instruction at levels
designed to realize the maximum increase in students achieving minimum proficiency, without
regard to such practice’s impact on students other than those in the focus/targeted group level. The
specific research questions this study proposed to answer are:

1.

Does state assessment data support the theory that high stakes accountability
systems encourage educators to disproportionately direct (distort) instructional
practices to minimum skills levels?

2

Does the distortion of instructional practices, if any, increase subject to the
accountability exposure of schools?

This section describes and justifies the research methodology and research methods proposed to
answer the above noted research questions.
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Research methodology is a generic term that refers to the general logic and theoretical
perspective of the research project (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003). Methodology is used to describe the
theory of how the research should proceed, and involves an analysis of the principles and procedures
for the particular field of research (deMarrais & Lapan, 2004).
Research methods
Methods is a term that generally refers to the specific tools and techniques used in research
(Bogdan and Biklen, 2003). Methods should be consistent with the logic embodied in the research
methodology (Bogdan and Biklen). Methods are specific research tools used by researchers to gain
fuller understanding of the phenomenon under investigation (deMarrais and Lapan, 2004).
This study utilized a quantitative approach, gathering publicly available, quantitative
assessment data from the Texas Education Agency, to determine the extent, if any, to which state and
federal accountability instruments may be impacting schools and school districts in the design and
delivery of curriculum and instruction and the extent, if any, to which said accountability models
disparately impact schools related to accountability-related risk factors.
The study involved a multi-grade, review of data measuring student performance on the
Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) at the item-level, to identify possible correlation
between a school’s accountability risk and the item-level assessment performance of students within
the school(s) which might suggest distortion related to the design and delivery of curriculum and
instruction to maximize performance of focus or bubble students in order to best meet the
increasingly pressing requirements of state and federal accountability instruments, specifically
Texas’s AEIS and the federal AYP provisions of NCLB.
Ethical Considerations
This researcher sought and was granted approval to conduct the study from the Institutional
Review Board of the University of Texas at El Paso. The data used for the comparison of risk group
item-level performance involved the use of campus-level, publicly available data, which did not
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contain information about individual students or the performance of individuals from the campuses.
No individual student level data was utilized or sought. All data was secondary performance level
data related to the performance of campuses at the item level.

Subjects and Selection of Subjects
At the present time, more than 90 percent of the nearly 53 million children attending
elementary and secondary schools in the United States are enrolled in public schools subject to
federal accountability under NCLB. In Texas alone nearly 4.6 million students are enrolled in
schools subject to both federal AYP and state AEIS accountability. In the selected district, more
than 60,000 students subject to both AEIS and AYP accountability requirements.
The subjects of this research study were elementary public schools in two Texas public
school districts; one a border area district (Far West Texas, ISD) and the other a central area
district (Central Texas, ISD). The study utilized metrics collected related to item-level
performance of students as well as test-score metric distributions. Fifteen, randomly selected
(within risk groups) elementary schools from each focus district are included in the study. A
careful examination of the schools’ past accountability performance as well as socioeconomic
and demographic data was done, and, based on such analyses, schools were placed into three
accountability risk groups: high-risk, moderate-risk, and low-risk.
Campuses were placed into accountability exposure groups based on the following
criteria:
High Risk – The high risk campus group includes all campuses that either (1) have
received an accountability rating of “unacceptable” or “missed AYP” during the past five years;
or (2) utilized exceptions for safe harbor, confidence intervals, subgroup sample size, or
projected growth in order to meet minimum expectations for AEIS or AYP.
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Moderate Risk – The moderate risk campus group consists of campuses that either (1)
have received an accountability rating of “unacceptable” or “missed AYP” since the inception of
NCLB AYP provisions; (2) utilized exceptions for safe harbor, confidence intervals, subgroup
sample size, or projected growth, in order to meet minimum expectations for AEIS/AYP; or (3)
would have received a negative accountability rating or would have needed exceptions as
described above to avoid such rating using the following year’s AMO targets (e.g., by applying
2010 requirements to a school’s 2009 data).
Low Risk – The low risk campus group consists of campuses that (1) have not been rated
“unacceptable” or “missed AYP”; (2) have not needed exceptions to achieve acceptable ratings;
and (3) would not have received negative accountability ratings even with the application of the
following year’s AMO targets.
The review of literature pertaining to the impact of accountability requirements to schools
and districts strongly suggests a difference in the impact of federal and/or state accountability for
campus related to their accountability risk, particularly as such risk reflects mandated
instructional practices related to the application of various levels of sanctions under the AYP
accountability instrument (Rouse, et al, 2007).
Research Design
To answer the first question of this study, the researcher conducted a comparison of itemlevel data for schools identified at high risk of facing accountability sanctions as defined below
with state item-level data to determine if the results of the focus campuses suggest a correlation
between student performance and possible distortion of instructional focus. The researcher
further conducted a comparison of district schools in various levels or groups of risk, ranging
from high-risk, moderate risk, and low risk to determine whether such distortion, if any, can be
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correlated to increasing levels of accountability risk. Campus were placed in risk groups based
on past accountability performance as described above.
Both studies compared student performance of campuses in the identified accountability
exposure groups on individual items ranked on a scale from easiest to most difficult (as
determined by state-level item metrics (Rasch, B-equate item difficulty measure) to determine if
campuses performance on items of various difficulty (i.e., requiring different levels of skill and
higher-order thinking) remains consistent with the focus group or lags in areas that suggest a
distortion in instructional focus.
The researcher used a simple regression model for exploring the relationship of the
predictive variable, item difficulty, as defined by the state metric described above, and the
dependent variable of this quantitative study, the item-level performance gap between students at
campuses within each focus group. The predictive variable for the item level data will describe
data from the 2010-2011 school year related to student performance on the TAKS reading and
mathematics tests at grades 3 and 5. Grades three and five were chosen as these grades are part
of the state’s Student Success Initiative (SSI), and thus more sensitive to the demands of
accountability. The SSI provisions, for example, provide for the potential retention of students
who do not score proficient on the state’s summative assessment. The predictive variable for
accountability exposure described campuses’ risk factors as described herein.
The research chose to focus the study on elementary campuses from a large west Texas
border area district and a large central Texas district because the researcher believed that the
diversity of these campuses would demonstrate that accountability risk factors have a distorting
effect on instructional practice that is not dependent upon the presence or lack of socioeconomic
factors. It was the researcher’s belief that, even when controlling for the direct effects of these
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factors, accountability exposure though itself indirectly related, would prove predictive to poorer
student performance at the item-level, despite schools’ otherwise acceptable, recognized, or even
exemplary, accountability ratings.
The research design of the study was a non-experimental, explanatory, correlation design
(Keppel & Zedeck, 1989) that employed simple regression analysis to measure the relationships
of the predictive variable (item difficult) and the dependent variable of item-level student
achievement gap on the Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills for the 2010-2011 school
year. Non-experimental research is considered “an important and appropriate mode of research
in education” (Johnson, 2001, p. 3) since such studies frequently involve areas where neither
randomized experiments nor quasi-experimental designs are possible. Johnson (2001) further
advises that explanatory studies must (a) develop or test theories about phenomenon that attempt
to explain “how” or “why” the phenomenon occurs, and (b) tries to identify correlations that may
represent potential causal factors.
Data was acquired from the Texas Education Agency technical digest and reports, TEA
school report cards 2002/2003 through 2010/2011 school years for purpose of assigning
campuses to accountability risk groups and from the 2010 TAKS performance data files for the
purpose of determining performance levels and performance gaps. Data pertaining to the gaps in
student performance were be entered into and manipulated/analyzed using SPSS/PAWS
statistical software. The researcher then employed a simple regression analysis which allows
correlation of the dependant variable or outcome “based on values of the predictive variables.”
(Field, 2009, p. 198). The use of existing data mitigated the potential reliability threat often
associated with independent data gathering techniques (Suskie, 1996).
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Data Analysis
The two research questions were examined by first conducting a descriptive correlational
analysis to discover if the predictor variable contributes to the independent variable. The
researcher utilized the following simple regression equation:
y = α + βx +ε, where x represents the predictor variable (item difficulty) and y represents the
outcome or dependent variable (item-level student achievement gap between the various risk
groups). According to Gelman and Hill (2007), linear regression is appropriate when seeking to
determine the relationship between a quantitative outcome and a quantitative explanatory
variable. In this study, the research sought to determine if a significant relationship existed
between the mean gap in student performance, measured item to item, and the difficulty level of
the item as determined by state item response theory (IRT) parameters, specifically the Rasch
differential.
To determine whether or not accountability risk was a significant factor in curricular
instruction, the mean p-values for students in all schools at each of the risk levels was calculated
for each item and regressed to determine a predictive relationship with regard to item difficulty,
with the underlying assumption being that an increased performance gap on more difficult items
would support the theory that schools subjected to escalating levels of accountability risk target
instruction away from the higher-order skills necessary to successfully answer such items (even
comparing the top performing students in each risk group). The null hypothesis was that no
significant difference existed between the gap in student performance related to item difficulty
or, in other words that students at the various ability levels within each risk group would exhibit
similar achievement gaps across the spectrum of item difficulty.
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Chapter Summary
This chapter began with a brief overview of the study that included a review of the
purpose of the study and the research questions. The researcher also described the investigative
mode and explained with the model was selected for the study. The chapter also details the
ethical considerations that the researcher reviewed related to the selection of subjects, along with
a description of how the researcher selected the subjects and determined their level of risk. In
addition, the research design and the plan for analyzing the data were reviewed.
Looking ahead, Chapter 4 will describe the results of the statistical testing and
preliminary analyses as to the significance of the independent variable as a predictor of the
student achievement gap under the model. The chapter will also include a break down of each of
the tests run for each of the two focus groups (limited English and economically disadvantaged)
isolated and excluded from students not coded in either of those groups. Finally, the chapter will
show the results of the TAAS control group testing along with a preliminary description of the
data.
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Chapter 4
RESULTS
This chapter will detail the preliminary results of the statistical testing for each test and
student group (e.g., economically disadvantaged and non economically disadvantaged) along
with a brief description related to the significance of the independent variable as a predictor of
student achievement gap and the relative strength of the model. The results of the data tables
will illustrate the statistical tests that were performed for each of the two focus groups (limited
English and economically disadvantaged). As will be seen, separate tests for each subgroup and
non-subgroup were isolated and excluded from other student groups in order to control for
characteristics of the subgroup with the model. Finally, the chapter will describe the result of the
TAAS control group testing along with a preliminary description of that data.
Investigative Model
Linear regression was utilized to test the hypothesis that the gap in student performance
at the item level between campus groups at different risk levels could be predicted from the
independent variable of item difficulty. Overall, as reported below, the model proved significant
for all 2011 TAKS assessments observed, in reading and in mathematics, both at third and fifth
grades, and when Limited English Proficient (LEP) and Economically Disadvantaged (ED)
students were isolated in the model or excluded from the model, Non Limited English Proficient
(NLEP) and Non Economically Disadvantaged (NED).
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Results of the Statistical Tests
Table #1
Grade 3 Reading Low Risk-High Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,40)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.936

.875

.872

3.5665

281.032

.000

LEP

.928

.862

.858

3.7419

249.411

.000

NED

.802

.643

.634

4.0234

71.966

.000

NLEP

.828

.686

.678

3.6481

87.208

.000

As Table 1 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is statistically significant for all
groups. The R Square value reflects that the model accounts for a sizeable percentage of the
variance in performance gap between the low and high risk group on the Grade 3 reading test
items relative to item difficulty, about 88 percent for the ED group and about 86 percent for the
LEP group. The model also accounted for a sizeable percentage of the variance within the NED
group (63 percent) and the NLEP group (68 percent).
As is illustrated in Table 2, below, the relationship was significant for all groups In
addition, the coefficients for all groups are positive, indicating that as item difficulty increases
the performance gap between campuses in the low and high risk groups likewise increases.
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Table # 2
Grade 3 Reading Low Risk-High Risk Gap Analysis

Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

11.614

.693

.936

16.764

.000

LEP

11.479

.727

.928

15.793

.000

NED

6.632

.782

.802

8.485

.000

NLEP

6.618

.709

.828

9.339

.000

As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the ED
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about an 11.6 unit increase in the student
performance gap.
Table #3
Grade 3 Reading Low Risk-Moderate Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,40)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.967

.934

.933

1.4819

569.790

.000

LEP

.989

.942

.943

1.4993

568.974

.000

NED

.718

.515

.503

3.3596

42.489

.000

NLEP

.781

.610

.600

2.8443

62.518

.000

As Table 3 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is statistically significant for all
groups. The R Square value reflects that the model accounts for a sizeable percentage of the
variance in performance gap between the low and moderate risk groups on the Grade 3 reading
test items relative to item difficulty, about 93 percent for the ED group and about 94 percent for
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the LEP group. The model also accounted for a sizeable percentage of the variance within the
NED group (51 percent) and the NLEP group (61 percent).
As is illustrated in Table 4, below, the relationship was significant for all groups. In
addition, the coefficients for all groups are positive, indicating that as item difficulty increases
the performance gap between campuses in the low and moderate risk groups likewise increases.
Table # 4
Grade 3 Reading Low Risk-Moderate Risk Gap Analysis

Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

6.872

.288

.967

23.870

.000

LEP

6.947

.291

.930

23.753

.000

NED

4.254

.653

.718

6.515

.000

NLEP

4.369

.553

.781

7.907

.000

As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the ED
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about a 6.9 unit increase in the student
performance gap.
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Table #5
Grade 3 Reading Moderate Risk-High Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,40)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.961

.923

.921

.9732

477.615

.000

LEP

.946

.896

.893

1.1350

343.826

.000

NED

.674

.454

.440

2.1229

33.611

.000

NLEP

.709

.502

.490

1.9793

40.318

.000

As Table 5 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is statistically significant for all
groups. The R Square value reflects that the model accounts for a sizeable percentage of the
variance in performance gap between the moderate and high risk group on the Grade 3 reading
test items relative to item difficulty, about 92 percent for the ED group and about 90 percent for
the LEP group. The model also accounted for a sizeable percentage of the variance within the
NED group (45 percent) and the NLEP group (50 percent).
As is illustrated in Table 6, below, the relationship was significant for all groups. In
addition, the coefficients for all groups are positive, indicating that as item difficulty increases
the performance gap between campuses in the moderate and high risk groups likewise increases.
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Table # 6
Grade 3 Reading Moderate Risk-High Risk Gap Analysis

Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

4.132

.189

.961

21.854

.000

LEP

4.088

.220

.946

18.543

.000

NED

2.378

.412

.674

5.766

.000

NLEP

2.441

.384

.709

6.350

.000

As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the ED
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about a 4.1 unit increase in the student
performance gap.
Table #7
Grade 3 Math Low Risk-High Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,42)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.910

.828

.824

3.3633

202.501

.000

LEP

.946

.895

.892

2.6596

357.800

.000

NED

.927

.859

.855

2.9026

255.539

.000

NLEP

.916

.840

.836

3.254

220.141

.000

As Table 7 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is statistically significant for all
groups. The R Square value reflects that the model accounts for a sizeable percentage of the
variance in performance gap between the low and high risk group on the Grade 3 math test items
relative to item difficulty, about 83 percent for the ED group and about 90 percent for the LEP
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group. The model also accounted for a sizeable percentage of the variance within the NED
group (86 percent) and the NLEP group (84 percent).
As is illustrated in Table 8, below, the relationship was significant for all groups. In
addition, the coefficients for all groups are positive, indicating that as item difficulty increases
the performance gap between campuses in the low and high risk groups likewise increases.
Table # 8
Grade 3 Math Low Risk-High Risk Gap Analysis
Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

8.561

.602

.910

14.320

.000

LEP

8.999

.476

.946

18.916

.000

NED

8.300

.519

.927

15.986

.000

NLEP

8.638

.582

.916

14.837

.000

As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the ED
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about an 8.6 unit increase in the student
performance gap.
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Table #9
Grade 3 Math Low Risk-Moderate Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,42)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.876

.767

.761

2.2412

138.130

.000

LEP

.910

.828

.824

1.8984

202.188

.000

NED

.877

.769

.764

2.3266

139.922

.000

NLEP

.889

.791

.786

2.1509

158.998

.000

As Table 9 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is statistically significant for all
groups. The R Square value reflects that the model accounts for a sizeable percentage of the
variance in performance gap between the low and moderate risk groups on the Grade 3 math test
items relative to item difficulty, about 77 percent for the ED group and about 83 percent for the
LEP group. The model also accounted for a sizeable percentage of the variance within the NED
group (77 percent) and the NLEP group (79 percent).
As is illustrated in Table 10, below, the relationship was significant for all groups. In
addition, the coefficients for all groups are positive, indicating that as item difficulty increases
the performance gap between campuses in the low and moderate risk groups likewise increases.

65

Table # 10
Grade 3 Math Low Risk-Moderate Risk Gap Analysis

Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

4.712

.401

.876

11.753

.000

LEP

4.829

.340

.910

14.219

.000

NED

4.923

.416

.877

11.829

.000

NLEP

4.369

.553

.781

7.907

.000

As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the ED
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about a 4.7 unit increase in the student
performance gap.
Table #11
Grade 3 Math Moderate Risk-High Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,42)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.674

.455

.442

1.8428

35.004

.000

LEP

.702

.493

.481

1.7475

40.828

.000

NED

.767

.588

.578

1.7017

59.845

.000

NLEP

.757

.573

.562

1.6933

56.271

.000

As Table 11 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is statistically significant for all
groups. The R Square value reflects that the model accounts for a sizeable percentage of the
variance in performance gap between the moderate and high risk group on the Grade 3 math test
items relative to item difficulty, about 46 percent for the ED group and about 48 percent for the
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LEP group. The model also accounted for a sizeable percentage of the variance within the NED
group (59 percent) and the NLEP group (57 percent).
As is illustrated in Table 12, below, the relationship was significant for all groups. In
addition, the coefficients for all groups are positive, indicating that as item difficulty increases
the performance gap between campuses in the moderate and high risk groups likewise increases.
Table # 12
Grade 3 Math Moderate Risk-High Risk Gap Analysis

Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

1.950

.330

.674

5.916

.000

LEP

1.997

.313

.702

6.390

.000

NED

2.355

.304

.767

7.736

.000

NLEP

2.272

.303

.757

7.501

.000

As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the ED
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about a 1.95 unit increase in the student
performance gap.
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Table #13
Grade 5 Reading Low Risk-High Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,46)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.948

.900

.897

3.5119

412.249

.000

LEP

.931

.867

.865

3.9953

301.095

.000

NED

.876

.768

.763

4.8953

152.368

.000

NLEP

.886

.786

.781

4.7017

168.474

.000

As Table 13 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is statistically significant for all
groups. The R Square value reflects that the model accounts for a sizeable percentage of the
variance in performance gap between the low and high risk group on the Grade 5 reading test
items relative to item difficulty, about 88 percent for the ED group and about 86 percent for the
LEP group. The model also accounted for a sizeable percentage of the variance within the NED
group (63 percent) and the NLEP group (68 percent).
As is illustrated in Table 14, below, the relationship was significant for all groups In
addition, the coefficients for all groups are positive, indicating that as item difficulty increases
the performance gap between campuses in the low and high risk groups likewise increases.
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Table # 14
Grade 5 Reading Low Risk-High Risk Gap Analysis

Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

11.077

.546

.948

20.304

.000

LEP

10.770

.621

.931

17.352

.000

NED

9.387

.760

.876

12.344

.000

NLEP

9.480

.730

.886

12.980

.000

As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the ED
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about an 11.6 unit increase in the student
performance gap.
Table # 15
Grade 5 Reading Low Risk-Moderate Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,46)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.974

.949

.948

1.5296

852.810

.000

LEP

.962

.926

.925

1.8787

578.090

.000

NED

.907

.824

.820

2.8214

214.624

.000

NLEP

.936

.875

.872

2.3924

322.556

.000

As Table 15 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is statistically significant for all
groups. The R Square value reflects that the model accounts for a sizeable percentage of the
variance in performance gap between the low and moderate risk groups on the Grade 5 reading
test items relative to item difficulty, about 93 percent for the ED group and about 94 percent for
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the LEP group. The model also accounted for a sizeable percentage of the variance within the
NED group (51 percent) and the NLEP group (61 percent).
As is illustrated in Table 16, below, the relationship was significant for all groups In
addition, the coefficients for all groups are positive, indicating that as item difficulty increases
the performance gap between campuses in the low and moderate risk groups likewise increases.
Table # 16
Grade 5 Reading Low Risk-Moderate Risk Gap Analysis
Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

6.939

.238

.974

29.203

.000

LEP

7.017

.292

.962

24.043

.000

NED

6.421

.438

.907

14.650

.000

NLEP

6.675

.372

.936

17.960

.000

As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the ED
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about a 6.9 unit increase in the student
performance gap.
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Table # 17
Grade 5 Reading Moderate Risk-High Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,46)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.971

.943

.941

.9633

756.320

.000

LEP

.934

.871

.869

1.5099

311.954

.000

NED

.894

.799

.795

1.7796

182.742

.000

NLEP

.922

.850

.847

1.5765

260.917

.000

As Table 17 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is statistically significant for all
groups. The R Square value reflects that the model accounts for a sizeable percentage of the
variance in performance gap between the moderate and high risk group on the Grade 5 reading
test items relative to item difficulty, about 92 percent for the ED group and about 90 percent for
the LEP group. The model also accounted for a sizeable percentage of the variance within the
NED group (45 percent) and the NLEP group (50 percent).
As is illustrated in Table 18, below, the relationship was significant for all groups. In
addition, the coefficients for all groups are positive, indicating that as item difficulty increases
the performance gap between campuses in the moderate and high risk groups likewise increases.
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Table # 18
Grade 5 Reading Moderate Risk-High Risk Gap Analysis

Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

4.115

.150

.971

27.50A

.000

LEP

4.143

.235

.934

17.662

.000

NED

3.737

.276

.894

13.518

.000

NLEP

3.956

.245

.922

16.153

.000

As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the ED
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about a 4.1 unit increase in the student
performance gap.
Table # 19
Grade 5 Math Low Risk-High Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,47)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.882

.779

.774

4.5247

168.840

.000

LEP

.944

.892

.889

3.2056

394.970

.000

NED

.865

.749

.744

4.9433

143.228

.000

NLEP

.871

.759

.754

4.8202

151.244

.000

As Table 19 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is statistically significant for all
groups. The R Square value reflects that the model accounts for a sizeable percentage of the
variance in performance gap between the low and high risk group on the Grade 5 math test items
relative to item difficulty, about 78 percent for the ED group and about 89 percent for the LEP
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group. The model also accounted for a sizeable percentage of the variance within the NED
group (75 percent) and the NLEP group (76 percent).
As is illustrated in Table 20, below, the relationship was significant for all groups In
addition, the coefficients for all groups are positive, indicating that as item difficulty increases
the performance gap between campuses in the low and high risk groups likewise increases.
Table # 20
Grade 5 Math Low Risk-High Risk Gap Analysis

Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

8.695

.669

.882

12.994

.000

LEP

9.422

.474

.944

19.874

.000

NED

8.749

.731

.865

11.968

.000

NLEP

8.767

.713

.871

12.298

.000

As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the ED
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about an 8.7 unit increase in the student
performance gap.

73

Table #21
Grade 5 Math Low Risk-Moderate Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,48)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.902

.814

.810

2.9917

210.489

.000

LEP

.942

.887

.884

2.1110

376.099

.000

NED

.887

.788

.783

3.1199

177.947

.000

NLEP

.891

.793

.789

3.1692

183.970

.000

As Table 21 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is statistically significant for all
groups. The R Square value reflects that the model accounts for a sizeable percentage of the
variance in performance gap between the low and moderate risk groups on the Grade 5 math test
items relative to item difficulty, about 81 percent for the ED group and about 89 percent for the
LEP group. The model also accounted for a sizeable percentage of the variance within the NED
group (79 percent) and the NLEP group (79 percent).
As is illustrated in Table 22, below, the relationship was significant for all groups. In
addition, the coefficients for all groups are positive, indicating that as item difficulty increases
the performance gap between campuses in the low and moderate risk groups likewise increases.
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Table # 22
Grade 5 Math Low Risk-Moderate Risk Gap Analysis

Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

6.419

.442

.902

14.508

.000

LEP

6.055

.312

.942

19.393

.000

NED

6.352

.476

.887

13.340

.000

NLEP

6.357

.469

.891

13.564

.000

As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the ED
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about a 6.4 unit increase in the student
performance gap.
Table # 23
Grade 5 Math Moderate Risk-High Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,48)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.920

.846

.843

1.6110

246.443

.000

LEP

.961

.923

.921

1.1850

573.165

.000

NED

.849

.721

.715

2.3419

123.942

.000

NLEP

.828

.686

.679

2.3761

104.703

.000

As Table 23 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is statistically significant for all
groups. The R Square value reflects that the model accounts for a sizeable percentage of the
variance in performance gap between the moderate and high risk group on the Grade 5 math test
items relative to item difficulty, about 85 percent for the ED group and about 92 percent for the
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LEP group. The model also accounted for a sizeable percentage of the variance within the NED
group (72 percent) and the NLEP group (69 percent).
As is illustrated in Table 24, below, the relationship was significant for all groups. In
addition, the coefficients for all groups are positive, indicating that as item difficulty increases
the performance gap between campuses in the moderate and high risk groups likewise increases.
Table # 24
Grade 5 Math Moderate Risk-High Risk Gap Analysis

Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

3.876

.238

.920

16.268

.000

LEP

4.196

.175

.961

23.941

.000

NED

3.856

.346

.849

11.133

.000

NLEP

3.596

.351

.828

10.232

.000

As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the ED
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about a 3.9 unit increase in the student
performance gap.
2002 TAAS Control Group Analyses
In addition to the 2011 TAKS data made the basis for the analyses described by the
previous 24 tables, the study examined 2002 TAAS data. The 2001-2002 school year marked
the final administration of the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) before it was
replaced the following year by TAKS and prior to the full implementation of NCLB
Accountability requirements. The researcher, therefore, hypothesized that the TAAS data would
show an insignificant or less significant gap among performance levels for schools in various
risk groups. A gap analysis of the TAAS student performance data for schools in the various risk
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groups revealed, in most cases, a significant but weak (in comparison with those demonstrated
by comparison of TAKS data) relationship between schools in the various risk groups. In other
cases, the regression revealed no relationship, and in a few instances, a fairly strong relationship
was determined.
Such a relationship, however, as noted earlier, was not unexpected. Although, as noted
above, NCLB Accountability mandates had yet to be implemented and no schools in the study
had yet been subjected to AYP requirements, let alone sanctions, the schools were subject to
accountability provisions of the state system, AEIS. Like AYP under NCLB, the AEIS system
relies on state assessment data to determine accountability ratings. However, the AEIS does not
employ a system of escalating sanctions as does the federal system, nor did the AEIS in 2002
have in place rigorous targets for focused subgroups. The presence of an accountability system
which applied pressure to educators to meet accountability guidelines is consistent with the
finding of a generally weaker though significant relationship between the student performance
data and item difficulty on the TAAS.
Table # 25
Grade 3 TAAS Reading Low Risk-High Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,40)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.424

.180

.159

0.7991

8.767

.005

LEP

.444

.197

.177

0.5662

9.794

.003

NED

.313

.098

.075

0.6743

4.332

.044

NLEP

.767

.589

.579

0.3547

57.292

.000

As Table 25 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is statistically significant for all
groups. The R Square value reflects that the model accounts for a small percentage of the
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variance in performance gap between the low and high risk group on the Grade 3 reading test
items relative to item difficulty, about 18 percent for the ED group and about 20 percent for the
LEP group. The model also accounted for a modest percentage of the variance within the NED
group (10 percent) and a sizeable percentage of the NLEP group (59 percent).
As is illustrated in Table 26, below, the relationship was significant for all groups In
addition, the coefficients for all groups are positive, indicating that as item difficulty increases
the performance gap between campuses in the low and high risk groups likewise increases.
Table # 26
Grade 3 TAAS Reading Low Risk-High Risk Gap Analysis

Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

0.455

.154

.424

2.961

.005

LEP

0.341

.109

.444

3.130

.003

NED

0.270

.130

.313

2.081

.044

NLEP

0.516

.068

.767

7.569

.000

As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the ED
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about a .45 unit increase in the student
performance gap.

78

Table # 27
Grade 3 TAAS Reading Low Risk-Moderate Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,40)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.541

.292

.274

0.5753

16.511

.000

LEP

.572

.327

.310

0.5363

19.419

.000

NED

.573

.329

.312

0.5355

19.599

.000

NLEP

.590

.348

.331

0.5301

21.305

.000

As Table 27 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is statistically significant for all
groups. The R Square value reflects that the model accounts for a modest percentage of the
variance in performance gap between the low and moderate risk groups on the Grade 3 reading
test items relative to item difficulty, about 29 percent for the ED group and about 33 percent for
the LEP group. The model also accounted for a modest percentage of the variance within the
NED group (33 percent) and the NLEP group (35 percent).
As is illustrated in Table 28, below, the relationship was significant for all groups. In
addition, the coefficients for all groups are positive, indicating that as item difficulty increases
the performance gap between campuses in the low and moderate risk groups likewise increases.
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Table # 28
Grade 3 TAAS Reading Low Risk-Moderate Risk Gap Analysis
Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

0.449

.111

.541

4.063

.000

LEP

0.454

.103

.572

4.407

.000

NED

0.456

.103

.573

4.427

.000

NLEP

0.470

.102

.590

4.616

.000

As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the ED
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about a 0.45 unit increase in the student
performance gap.
Table # 29
Grade 3 TAAS Reading Moderate Risk-High Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,40)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.424

.180

.159

0.7991

8.767

.005

LEP

.364

.132

.111

0.8077

6.095

.018

NED

.493

.243

.224

0.7382

12.831

.001

NLEP

.245

.060

.036

0.8330

2.545

.119

As Table 29 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is statistically significant for all
groups with the exception of the non-LEP group, which is not significant. However, the R
Square value reflects that the model accounts for a modest percentage of the variance in
performance gap between the moderate and high risk group on the Grade 3 reading test items
relative to item difficulty, about 18 percent for the ED group and about 13 percent for the LEP
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group. The model also accounted for a modest percentage of the variance within the NED group
(24 percent).
As is illustrated in Table 30, below, the relationship was significant for all groups except
the non-LEP group. In addition, the coefficients for all groups are positive, indicating that as
item difficulty increases the performance gap between campuses in the moderate and high risk
groups likewise increases.
Table # 30
Grade 3 TAAS Reading Moderate Risk-High Risk Gap Analysis

Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

0.455

.154

.424

2.961

.005

LEP

0.383

.155

.364

2.469

.018

NED

0.508

.142

.493

3.582

.001

NLEP

0.255

.160

.245

1.595

.119

As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the ED
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about a 0.46 unit increase in the student
performance gap.
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Table # 31
Grade 3 TAAS Math Low Risk-High Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,44)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.664

.442

.428

0.5631

33.209

.000

LEP

.525

.275

.258

0.6944

15.940

.000

NED

.634

.401

.387

0.5352

28.175

.000

NLEP

.630

.397

.383

0.6095

27.667

.000

As Table 31 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is statistically significant for all
groups. The R Square value reflects that the model accounts for a moderate percentage of the
variance in performance gap between the low and high risk group on the Grade 3 math test items
relative to item difficulty, about 44 percent for the ED group and about 28 percent for the LEP
group. The model also accounted for a moderate percentage of the variance within the NED
group (40 percent) and the NLEP group (40 percent).
As is illustrated in Table 32, below, the relationship was significant for all groups In
addition, the coefficients for all groups are positive, indicating that as item difficulty increases
the performance gap between campuses in the low and high risk groups likewise increases.
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Table # 32
Grade 3 TAAS Math Low Risk-High Risk Gap Analysis
Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

0.564

.098

.664

5.763

.000

LEP

0.451

.113

.525

3.992

.000

NED

0.494

.093

.634

5.308

.000

NLEP

0.558

.106

.630

5.260

.000

As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the ED
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about an 0.56 unit increase in the student
performance gap.
Table # 33
Grade 3 TAAS Math Low Risk-Moderate Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,44)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.416

.173

.153

0.8090

8.770

.000

LEP

.572

.327

.310

0.5363

19.419

.000

NED

.684

.468

.456

0.5230

36.996

.000

NLEP

.288

.083

.061

0.8118

3.788

.058

As Table 33 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is statistically significant for all
groups, except the non-LEP group, which is not significant, though barely. The R Square value
reflects that the model accounts for a sizeable percentage of the variance in performance gap
between the low and moderate risk groups on the Grade 3 math test items relative to item
difficulty, about 17 percent for the ED group and about 33 percent for the LEP group. The
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model also accounted for a moderate percentage of the variance within the NED group (46
percent).
As is illustrated in Table 34, below, the relationship was significant for all groups, except
the non-LEP group. In addition, the coefficients for all groups are positive, indicating that as
item difficulty increases the performance gap between campuses in the low and moderate risk
groups likewise increases.
Table # 34
Grade 3 TAAS Math Low Risk-Moderate Risk Gap Analysis

Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

0.417

.141

.416

2.961

.005

LEP

0.454

.103

.572

4.407

.000

NED

0.553

.091

.684

6.082

.000

NLEP

0.275

.141

.288

1.946

.058

As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the ED
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about a 0.41 unit increase in the student
performance gap.
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Table #35
Grade 3 TAAS Math Moderate Risk-High Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,44)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.424

.180

.159

0.7991

8.767

.005

LEP

.364

.132

.111

0.8077

6.095

.018

NED

.899

.808

.804

0.3270

177.170

.000

NLEP

.824

.679

.671

0.3850

88.851

.000

As Table 11 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is statistically significant for all
groups. The R Square value reflects that the model accounts for a moderate percentage of the
variance in performance gap between the moderate and high risk group on the Grade 3 math test
items relative to item difficulty, about 42 percent for the ED group and about 36 percent for the
LEP group. The model also accounted for a sizeable percentage of the variance within the NED
group (81 percent) and the NLEP group (68 percent).
As is illustrated in Table 36, below, the relationship was significant for all groups. In
addition, the coefficients for all groups are positive, indicating that as item difficulty increases
the performance gap between campuses in the moderate and high risk groups likewise increases.
Table # 36
Grade 3 TAAS Math Moderate Risk-High Risk Gap Analysis
Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

0.455

.154

.424

2.961

.005

LEP

0.383

.155

.364

2.469

.018

NED

0.757

.057

.899

13.311

.000

NLEP

0.631

.067

.824

9.426

.000
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As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the ED
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about a 0.45 unit increase in the student
performance gap.
Table # 37
Grade 5 TAAS Reading Low Risk-High Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,44)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.353

.125

.106

0.6582

6.545

.014

LEP

.506

.256

.240

0.6267

15.843

.000

NED

.444

.198

.180

0.6454

11.322

.002

NLEP

.310

.096

.076

0.6459

4.876

.032

As Table 37 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is statistically significant for all
groups. The R Square value reflects that the model accounts for a modest percentage of the
variance in performance gap between the low and high risk group on the Grade 5 reading test
items relative to item difficulty, about 13 percent for the ED group and about 26 percent for the
LEP group. The model also accounted for a moderate percentage of the variance within the
NED group (20 percent) and the NLEP group (10 percent).
As is illustrated in Table 38, below, the relationship was significant for all groups In
addition, the coefficients for all groups are positive, indicating that as item difficulty increases
the performance gap between campuses in the low and high risk groups likewise increases.

86

Table # 38
Grade 5 TAAS Reading Low Risk-High Risk Gap Analysis
Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

0.267

.104

.353

2.558

.014

LEP

0.396

.099

.506

3.980

.000

NED

0.344

.102

.444

3.365

.002

NLEP

0.226

.102

.310

2.208

.032

As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the ED
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about a 0.27 unit increase in the student
performance gap.
Table # 39
Grade 5 TAAS Reading Low Risk-Moderate Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,46)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.027

.001

-.021

0.6692

0.0330

.857

LEP

.226

.051

.030

0.6928

2.4750

.123

NED

.113

.013

-.009

0.6987

0.5920

.446

NLEP

.003

.000

-.022

0.6489

0.0000

.986

As Table 39 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is not statistically significant for
any group. The R Square value reflects that the model accounts for less than a significant
percentage of the variance in performance gap between the low and moderate risk groups on the
Grade 5 reading test items relative to item difficulty.
As is illustrated in Table 40, below, the relationship was significant for only the LEP
subgroup. In addition, though the coefficients for all groups except the non-LEP subgroup are
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positive, indicating that as item difficulty increases the performance gap between campuses in
the low and moderate risk groups likewise increases, the strength of the association is extremely
weak, and therefore unreliable, which conclusion is reinforced by the negative coefficient for the
non-LEP subgroup score, indicating, counter intuitively, that as item difficulty increases the
performance gap decreases.
Table # 40
Grade 5 TAAS Reading Low Risk-Moderate Risk Gap Analysis

Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

0.019

.106

.027

0.181

.857

LEP

0.173

.110

.226

1.573

.000

NED

0.085

.111

.113

0.769

.446

NLEP

- 0.002

.103

- .003

- .0180

.986

As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the LEP
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about a .17 unit increase in the student
performance gap.
Table # 41
Grade 5 TAAS Reading Moderate Risk-High Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,46)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.457

.209

.191

0.4918

12.120

.001

LEP

.634

.402

.389

0.4633

30.899

.000

NED

.569

.323

.309

0.4674

21.983

.000

NLEP

.477

.228

.211

0.4996

13.573

.001
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As Table 41 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is statistically significant for all
groups. The R Square value reflects that the model accounts for a modest percentage of the
variance in performance gap between the moderate and high risk group on the Grade 5 reading
test items relative to item difficulty, about 21 percent for the ED group and about 40 percent for
the LEP group. The model also accounted for a sizeable percentage of the variance within the
NED group (32 percent) and the NLEP group (23 percent).
As is illustrated in Table 42, below, the relationship was significant for all groups. In
addition, the coefficients for all groups are positive, indicating that as item difficulty increases
the performance gap between campuses in the moderate and high risk groups likewise increases.
Table # 42
Grade 5 TAAS Reading Moderate Risk-High Risk Gap Analysis

Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

0.271

.078

.457

3.481

.001

LEP

0.408

.073

.634

5.559

.000

NED

0.348

.074

.569

4.689

.000

NLEP

0.292

.079

.477

3.684

.001

As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the ED
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about a 0.27 unit increase in the student
performance gap.
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Table # 43
Grade 5 TAAS Math Low Risk-High Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,48)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.353

.125

.106

0.6582

6.545

.014

LEP

.394

.155

.138

0.6843

8.826

.005

NED

.393

.154

.137

0.6902

8.766

.005

NLEP

.310

.096

.076

0.6458

4.876

.032

As Table 43 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is statistically significant for all
groups. The R Square value reflects that the model accounts for a sizeable percentage of the
variance in performance gap between the low and high risk group on the Grade 5 math test items
relative to item difficulty, about 13 percent for the ED group and about 16 percent for the LEP
group. The model also accounted for a sizeable percentage of the variance within the NED
group (15 percent) and the NLEP group (10 percent).
As is illustrated in Table 44, below, the relationship was significant for all groups In
addition, the coefficients for all groups are positive, indicating that as item difficulty increases
the performance gap between campuses in the low and high risk groups likewise increases.
Table # 44
Grade 5 TAAS Math Low Risk-High Risk Gap Analysis
Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

0.267

.104

.353

2.558

.014

LEP

0.301

.101

.394

2.971

.005

NED

0.302

.102

.393

2.961

.005

NLEP

0.226

.102

.310

2.208

.032
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As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the ED
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about an 0.27 unit increase in the student
performance gap.
Table # 45
Grade 5 TAAS Math Low Risk-Moderate Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,48)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.027

.001

- .021

0.6692

0.033

.857

LEP

.182

.033

.013

0.8650

1.637

.207

NED

.364

.133

.115

0.6523

7.338

.009

NLEP

.387

.149

.122

0.6989

7.870

.015

As Table 45 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is statistically significant for
only the NED and NLEP groups. The R Square value reflects that the model accounts for a
small percentage of the variance in performance gap between the low and moderate risk groups
on the Grade 5 math test items relative to item difficulty, about 36 percent for the NED group
and 39 percent for the NLEP group.
As is illustrated in Table 46, below, the relationship was not significant for the ED and
LEP groups. In addition, the coefficients for all groups are positive, indicating that as item
difficulty increases the performance gap between campuses in the low and moderate risk groups
likewise increases.
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Table # 46
Grade 5 TAAS Math Low Risk-Moderate Risk Gap Analysis

Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

0.019

.106

.027

0.181

.857

LEP

0.164

.128

.182

1.280

.207

NED

0.262

.097

.364

2.709

.009

NLEP

0.369

.153

.481

2.907

.015

As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the NLEP
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about a 0.37 unit increase in the student
performance gap.
Table # 47
Grade 5 TAAS Math Moderate Risk-High Risk Gap Summary

Group

R

R Square

Adjusted
R Square

Standard Error
of the Estimate

F(1,42)

Sig

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

ED

.457

.209

.191

0.4912

12.120

.001

LEP

.283

.080

.061

1.0084

4.181

.046

NED

.609

.371

.358

0.6041

28.275

.000

NLEP

.477

.228

.211

0.4996

13.573

.001

As Table 47 illustrates, the F-test indicates the regression model is statistically significant for all
groups, though only slightly so for the LEP group. The R Square value reflects that the model
accounts for a modest percentage of the variance in performance gap between the moderate and
high risk group on the Grade 5 math test items relative to item difficulty, about 21 percent for the
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ED group and about 8 percent for the LEP group. The model also accounted for a moderate
percentage of the variance within the NED group (37 percent) and the NLEP group (23 percent).
As is illustrated in Table 48, below, the relationship was significant for all groups. In
addition, the coefficients for all groups are positive, indicating that as item difficulty increases
the performance gap between campuses in the moderate and high risk groups likewise increases.
Table # 48
Grade 5 TAAS Math Moderate Risk-High Risk Gap Analysis

Group

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig

______________________________________________________________________________

ED

0.271

.078

.457

3.481

.001

LEP

0.305

.149

.283

2.045

.046

NED

0.475

.089

.609

5.317

.000

NLEP

0.292

.079

.477

3.684

.001

As the table indicates, the sizes of the coefficients vary, but indicate, for example in the NED
group that each one unit increase in difficulty yields about a 0.48 unit increase in the student
performance gap.
Chapter Summary
This chapter described the preliminary results of the statistical testing for each test and student
group (e.g., limited English proficient, non-limited English proficient, economically
disadvantaged, and non economically disadvantaged), provided a brief discussion as to the
significance of the independent variable as a predictor of student achievement gap, and described
the relative strength of the model. The results of analyses were reported in tables that illustrated
the statistical tests that were performed for each of the focus groups (limited English proficient
and economically disadvantaged/non-limited English proficient and non economically
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disadvantaged). The results reported separate tests for each subgroup and non-subgroup, isolated
and excluded from other student groups, to control for subgroup characteristics not accounted for
in the basic model. Lastly, the chapter describes the results of the TAAS control group testing
along with a preliminary description of that data.
The final chapter will describe the study context, a review of the study questions, and the
methods the researcher used to conduct the study, as well as a description of the results and how
they relate to the theoretical framework. The researcher includes some preliminary conclusions
drawn from the data along with some suggestions for further research related to the study. The
chapter then reviews the extant literature in light of the preliminary study results. Finally the
chapter describes possible implications for both practice and policymakers, and ends with some
personal, concluding remarks.
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Chapter 5
DISCUSSION
This chapter will describe the context of the study, briefly review study questions as well
the methods employed by the researcher for the study, and discussion of theoretical framework
as it relates to the results. Next the researcher draws a few brief preliminary conclusions based
on analyses of the results and describes some suggestions for further research. A review of the
extant literature follows, adding the perspective of the study results. The chapter ends with a
description of possible implications for practice as well as policymakers, along with some final,
concluding remarks.
Study Context
A major issue this study attempts to address relates to the efficacy of policies that hold
school districts, schools, and teachers accountable for the performance of students on state
administered summative assessments, such as the TAKS test. The evidence, as discussed in the
introduction to this dissertation, is by and large inconclusive, with a variety of authors, such as
Braun (2004), Carnoy and Loeb (2002), and Hanuskeck and Raymond (2004), presenting
evidence that seems to suggest a link between high-stakes accountability and improved student
achievement. With regard to this study, the Carnoy and Loeb (2002) study is especially
provocative, in that the authors found that the greater the external pressure created by the
accountability system, the greater the improvement gains in student achievement. In contrast,
the this dissertation sought to establish that the external pressure placed upon schools, at least to
the extent that some schools are designated as low performing or failing to meet adequate yearly
progress, has a detrimental impact on students in that such pressure induces educators to design
and deliver instruction in order to realize the quickest, easiest, and surest score gains on the state
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assessment instrument. Although these two theories appear to be diametrically opposed, they are
less so than might be assumed at first glance. Moreover, this study is not directly concerned with
the raw test scores of any one group of students but rather the gap between student groups and
how such gap, and changes in it, relate to the instructional philosophy practiced at the schools
and whether that philosophy reflects distortion created by the pressures exerted through the
accountability system.
In analyzing the results of this study, it is vital to keep in mind several implications
related to the general theory of distortion and the variety of ways in which it manifests itself in
public schools. First, as noted earlier in this study and should be intuitively evident, if school
practices, such as the targeted instruction suggested herein, are able to mask significant problems
in the instructional environment from detection, perception of which is obscured by myopic
accountability system, then public policy in this realm has failed. Far worse, however, if such
practices do more than passively mask existing problems, but rather systemically alter the
instructional program so that it no longer serves every student to the full range of their potential,
as the results of this study suggest, then the accountability instrument established to implement
said policy has not only failed, it has become a far bigger problem than the one it was designed
to solve. Second, when the design of the system, as detailed herein, creates large inequities
between measures, expectations, standards of achievement, and proficiency targets, such a
system cannot practically be utilized as an arbiter of school efficacy.
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Research Questions
This research study was guided by two primary questions related to the impact of high-stakes
accountability policies on the educational practices of teachers, schools, and school districts:
1.

Does state assessment data support the theory that high stakes accountability
systems encourage educators to disproportionately direct (distort) instructional
practices to minimum skills levels?

2.

Does the distortion of instructional practices, if any, increase subject to the
accountability exposure of schools?

This study was conducted with data collected from two large Texas school districts, which will
herein be referred to using the following pseudonyms: Far West Texas ISD and Central Texas
ISD. The researcher selected five schools from each district for each category of risk, for a total
of fifteen schools from each district. The total aggregate number of schools represented in the
study was thirty. The thirty schools had a combined student population of approximately 2718 at
grade 3 and 3364 at grade 5 who participated in the 2011 TAKS administration for reading and
math, though the numbers varied slightly from reading to math in both cases. This is most likely
due to students moving into and/or out of the state between administrations.
Methods
Individual student scores were not used in this study. Texas technical digest reports and
data files (all publicly available) were used to determine the average score for the students at
each campus on each item within the test administrations. The average for each campus was
multiplied by the number of students who took part in the administration of the test at that
campus. Then, the scores of all campuses were summed and divided by the total number of
students in the risk group. This important step was done to alleviate the potential for schools that
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had exceptionally higher or lower populations to skew the sample. From these figures, an
overall average for campuses within each risk group was calculated for each item on the four
tests that were studied (Grade 3 reading and math, and Grade 5 reading and math). Then, the
researcher calculated the gap between the scores on each item between the high and low risk
groups, the high and medium risk groups, and the medium and low risk group. The data tables
were then analyzed using simple linear regression with SPSS statistical software version 20, to
determine if the gap was significantly related to item difficulty (as defined by state IRT
parameters, specifically the item's Rasch differential statistic).
If the gap increase is significantly related to item difficulty, then one might infer as a
possible cause that students in the medium and especially high risk groups were receiving a
disproportionate and inappropriate amount of instruction at the basic skills level. In all cases, the
results of the analyses were that the gap was significantly and positively impacted by the
difficulty of the items, meaning that the gap increased predictably with the level of increased
difficulty.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework for this study is based principally on Campbell (1979) and
Simon's (1978) work with performance measurement and its relationship to incentive theory as
developed by Laffont and Martimort (2001). Both of these concepts have relevance to the
hypotheses of this study and are reflected in the performance of the students at the campus which
are the subject thereof. As discussed earlier, Campbell's (1979) Law of Performance
Measurement directly relates the underlying theory upon which this study was designed.
Campbell's law attempts to explain the disparity between accountability goals and actual
accountability outcomes and speculates that the failure of accountability systems to incentivize

98

actors as intended often stems from the systems' reliance on flawed metrics. Metrics can be
flawed for several reasons, including indirect or loose alignment, poor reliability, sampling error,
and deception.
In this dissertation several of these possible flaws have been discussed with regard to
assessment metrics. The most egregious flaw concerns the alignment of the metric and the goal.
Seeking to explain why public accountability systems frequently failed, whether they concerned
public education or public transportation, Campbell (1979) determined that the accountability
systems commonly used metrics that were poor fits for the outcomes they were intended to
measure. At first glance, a test score would seem a natural match for a system designed to
measured student achievement. However, much debate concerns how well standardized tests
actually measure student achievement. The main reason cited by researchers, such as McNeil
(2000) and Wright (2002), is that summative assessments cover only a small portion of the state
curriculum. The reasons for this are principally financial and practical in nature. Many
standards in the state curriculum are observational or chart something over time, elements that
cannot be emulated on a standardized test, particularly in the context of multiple choice
questions. Nor would such tests be financially feasible. Finally, given the already trying nature
of state testing, it is scary to imagine students being subjected to the much lengthier tests that
would by necessity have to be given to accommodate a test covering the full curriculum.
In response, schools, according to Madaus (1988), naturally have tended to focus on the
areas being assessed. He notes that this is especially true in schools that are struggling to meet
accountability demands. McNeil & Valenzuela (2000) have specifically addressed the harmful
impact of testing in Texas, noting the targeting of tested curriculum not only in scope but in
depth. On the other hand, proponents such as Crocker (2005) and Wilson (2002) have expressed
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not only comfort, but indeed enthusiasm for the idea that testing play a central role in shaping
curriculum and instructional practice. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that school districts and
schools have come close to officially sanctioning such practice. For example, Wilson (2002)
argues that the assessments have been useful in encouraging teachers to cover materials that they
might in the past have found excuses to overlook or ignore because the material was not
something they enjoyed teaching or fully understood themselves. Likewise, Crocker (2005) feels
the role of assessment in determining what is taught in the classroom is appropriate, particularly
when the assessments are “tied to state-developed curricular standards” (166). Although such an
endorsement may sound tacitly logical, the impact on curriculum that most educators worry
about is not what is getting taught so much as what is not getting taught and at what levels the
instruction that does take place is delivered. As Padilla (2005) has noted, accountability
pressures have shifted schools focus away from the primary goal of education into a battle to stay
open. When schools begin to practice this type of educational triage and make decisions based
more on accountability concerns than on the interests of a student’s education, clearly the latter
will suffer. That schools frequently make decisions about not only what is taught, but also to
what extent it must be taught to achieve satisfactory results, helps to explain why students at
those schools master higher-order thinking skills at an even more anemic rate than they do other
skills as the results of this study suggest, even when the overall “passing” rate qualifies the
school for academic accolades such as an “exemplary” rating or a Blue Ribbon School
designation. When schools which are rated “acceptable” exhibit much stronger performance
levels on the most difficult test items than school rated “commended” or “exemplary,” as this
analysis showed, then the metric is clearly not aligned to the goal.
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In addition to alignment issues with metrics trying to measure the efficacy of public
accountability systems, data reliability is also a factor that can create a flawed metric. As
described herein, Linn (2009) and Koretz (2000), among others, have raised troubling questions
about the validity of the test results as accurate measures, even of the tests themselves, let alone
of the efficacy of a school. The fact that these researchers have found compelling evidence that
much of score variance is unrelated to instructional differences but is more a function of nonpersistent factors, lends credence to the idea that the test scores are poorly aligned indicators, as
well as being flawed from a validation standpoint. In addition, as Rothstein (2008) has argued,
targeting instruction disproportionately to certain areas likely to yield the best accountability
results is a type of sampling error as is the practice of manipulating testing cohorts with the same
intention. Such manipulation may not rise to the level of outright fraud which educators have
increasingly been involved in, but they fit the model that Campbell (1979) and Simon (1978)
envisioned related to flawed metrics and their role in corrupting the institution they are trying to
measure.
The assertion that the corrupting influence of incentives takes on an added intensity when
risk is introduced has been the subject of much of the work of Laffont and Martimort (2001).
The researchers examined the role of risk in an incentive-based relationship and determined that
the greater the risk imbalance the less effective the incentive became in affecting a desired
behavior. In an incentive-based relationship one party attempts to encourage a desired behavior,
in this case, a robust effort to improve student learning, by offering an incentive to reward
evidence of the desired behavior. Many incentive-based relationships are deemed risk-neutral,
meaning that the risk which the actor is subjected to is not increased or decreased by the
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presence of the incentive. An actor failing to evidence the desired indicator would not earn the
incentive reward but would not be subject to further penalty.
However, incentive-based relationships can also be risk averse, meaning that the
incentive, which would more accurately be called a disincentive, subjects the actor to increased
levels of risk because evidencing the desired behavior does not create a reward for the actor but
rather allows a continuation of the status quo. Accordingly, Laffont and Martimort (2001) argue,
risk averse systems in accordance with Campbell's (1979) theory of performance measurement
tend to have a very corrupting influence on the system they are trying to measure. This tendency
occurs because these systems induce actors to take shortcuts which may or may not be consistent
with the goal, in an attempt to preserve the status quo. This is especially true, according to
Laffont and Martimort when the indicators are considered unfair or unreasonable.
In the case of educators, trying to avoid sanctions, public humiliation, and ultimately loss
of employment, such shortcuts are manifested by way of attempts to circumvent the intended
processes so as to enhance the probability of achieving the desired indicator. Relating back to
Figures 1 and 2 herein, then, educators may look to circumvent the desired continuous
improvement model by avoiding rather than confronting challenges that threaten to impair or
prevent the educators from achieving the desired indicator and preserving the status quo. The
circumvention often takes the form of restricting the curriculum, teaching to the test, and even
cohort manipulation. In still rare, but increasingly common, situations, the circumvention has
taken the form of fraudulent activity. The contention that educators may be especially susceptible
to risk averse behavior is bolstered by the perception of many that the system is unfairly applied,
in that it relies on metrics that are not truly comparable from actor to actor, and that it is
unreasonable because it sets an unrealistic goal of 100 percent proficiency.
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This study is based on this risk-aversion premise, as it argues that schools at risk for
accountability sanctions skew instruction in an effort to meet accountability requirements.
Moreover, the risk that schools are subject to is not static, but rather becomes more adverse over
time as campuses continue to fall short of the desired indicator. With each successive failure,
additional and more punitive sanctions are imposed putting the campus at greater risk and
increasing the likelihood of risk averse behavior. The results of this study, which indicate a drop
off in student performance between risk groups as difficulty increases, supports such a theory.
Conclusions
Many studies that seek to understand relationships between two sets of separate
observations suffer somewhat from the chicken and egg dilemma. This is nowhere more true
than in the field of education, where educators are continuously seeking to understand why some
students are more successful than others. In doing so, however, educators must continually be on
guard to clarify whether a certain activity or behavior (e.g., participation in band or orchestra) is
in fact a contributor to student achievement as a cursory glance at the data may suggest, or
whether the data is merely a reflection of the types of students who choose to participate in band
or orchestra. As Pearl (2009) notes, this is a Simpson’s paradox, as first described more than a
century ago by Karl Pearson, who held that any statistical relationship between two variables can
be reversed by including additional factors in the analysis. For example, Pearl notes that a test of
two groups may seem to indicate that participants who smoke score better on achievement tests
than those who do not. Controlling for age, however, the researcher may discover that smoking
instead predicts lower achievement. On the other hand, a further factor added to the model, for
example, parental education or household income, may mitigate such results.
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Consistent with Simpson’s paradox then, conclusions related to student achievement
based on assessment data are certainly not irreproachable. However, the observations made as
part of this study combined with the substantial body of existing research related to the impact of
accountability on curriculum and instruction provide reasonable support for the theory which
serves as the basis for this study. The statistical models applied herein suggest a very strong
relationship between the gap in students' abilities with regard to successfully answering
questions requiring higher order skills and the extent to which accountability risks may be
impacting instructional practice at their campuses. As Oakes (2005) has noted, students who do
not have access to demanding curriculum and challenging instruction are “less likely to develop
the higher-order thinking skills necessary to solve rigorous problems” (128).

Consistent with

Oakes’ argument, a study of Texas students who performed badly on the state assessments noted
a persistent lack of higher-order thinking skills necessary to correctly answer questions on the
test, especially those that require reasoning and extension of ideas between concepts. (Texas
Study of Students at Risk: Case Studies Supporting Ninth Graders’ Success, 2004).
Clearly, student performance at campuses in the high and moderate risk group indicated a
potential deficit in the higher order thinking skills required to answer the more difficult questions
on the test. Certainly, it would be ill advised to suggest that such a deficit was entirely the result
of how campuses in those risk groups reacted to the pressures of avoiding accountability
sanctions under AYP. Likewise, however, it would be counterintuitive to insist that such
practices as assessment worksheets, classes focused on assessment remediation, mock testing,
and the insistence that students learn trendy test-taking strategies, would not necessarily result in
a reduction of instruction targeted at the higher order skills necessary to answer even the
toughest questions on the assessment, to say nothing of the difficulties students may face upon
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leaving the controlled assessment environment and entering the world where multiple choice
questions are few and far between.
The findings of this study suggest that students who attend campuses with significant
accountability risk, may not be getting the exposure to higher order thinking which Oakes (2009)
believes they need and that is consistent with the Texas study described earlier. In each of the
twenty-four regression analyses performed to compare performance between campus risk groups
while isolating to mitigate other potential contributing factors, such as socioeconomic status and
limited English proficiency, a significant difference was found in the mean item score of the
groups that widened substantially as item difficulty increased. Therefore, it is reasonable to
assume, that students at the campuses in the high and moderate risk categories were less prepared
to handle higher order cognitive demands than students in the low risk category. Whether or not
the accountability system is creating, aggravating, or merely illuminating this problem may be a
subject for continued study and debate, but one thing seems obvious: the accountability system
is not alleviating such gaps as it was intended to do and as was premised as the underlying
foundation upon which this unprecedented policy effort was constructed.
Relative to the research questions underlying this study, the state assessment data at the
item level for both the 2011 TAKS reading and math assessments indicates a significant
relationship to the item level difficulty both at grade 3 and grade 5. The relationship persisted
both when LEP and ED students were isolated and factored out as part of the study. In this
respect, the data is consistent with the concept that schools with substantial accountability risk
may distort typical instructional practice and focus disproportionately on test preparation, though
they do so at the expense of opportunities to maximize the educational development of students
to their fullest potential.
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To this extent, the results of the study support the theory that schools in the high and
moderate risk groups are more successful at elevating students to minimum skills levels than at
extending them beyond that level. Further, as the study revealed a significant effect not only
between schools in the high and low risk groups, but also revealed significant effects both
between the low and the moderate risk group and between the moderate and high risk group, it is
reasonable to assume that the difficulty of preparing students for the more challenging and
rigorous of the test questions, increases in accordance with the campuses' accountability risk.
Regarding the question of whether such distortion increases as risk levels increase, it
would seem logical to infer that the difficulty of preparing students for the most challenging and
rigorous test questions, as described in the paragraph above, is likely a function of the
educational philosophy of the school. It is also likely that schools within the moderate and high
risk groups may indeed adopt strategies and adapt practice in order to more directly address
immediate concerns of sanctions and accountability, not to mention job security, at the expense
of instruction that might otherwise have provided students with more opportunity to engage in
and work through difficult test questions which require higher order skills.
Links to Extant Literature
The relatively strong relationship between the gaps demonstrated by students attending
schools subjected to different levels of accountability risk with the difficulty of the test item and
the conceptual ability needed to attack and solve the most difficult items align well with
Campbell (1979) and Simon’s (1978) theoretical framework regarding the tendency of
accountability systems to corrupt and distort the very systems which they are trying to measure.
Other studies and authors who have taken interest in the impact of accountability on schools and
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education include Donovan, Figlio, and Rush (2006) whose study involved the effects that
school accountability has had on college-bound students.
This study looked at the performance of students from schools that have faced
accountability sanctions once they entered college to determine if study skills and educational
approaches to which the students were exposed, presumably due to such accountability pressures
versus the approaches students presumably would have been exposed to at schools without such
concerns, to determine if there were differences in how the students faired in college and how
they approached studies. One finding from the study suggested that students from schools that
had faced accountability pressures were more likely to neglect studies until shortly before an
assignment or exam was due and to then cram to prepare, with the implication being that this
approach is a common tactic employed by schools desperate to achieve minimum proficiency
marks.
I found this an especially compelling study in that it suggested a negative impact on a
population of students (who later entered college) who likely were not the focus of the
instructional practices they were subjected to, but who rather were impacted, at least in the
authors’ opinion, because they were subjected to curriculum and instructional practices for which
they were ill-suited, rather than challenged and extended in such a manner that would have better
prepared them for the rigorous educational demands they would face in college.
Hanushek and Raymond (2004) looked at how school accountability systems impact the
level and distribution of student achievement. Their study used NAEP results and involved
measuring not only gains and losses at the state level for participants from states with strict
accountability systems (i.e., those that imposed some form of sanction for poor performance)
against those from participants from states that had softer accountability systems that, for

107

example, may have only reported results from annual testing. The authors noted that the overall
impact of adopting a strong accountability instrument seemed to be positive, but note that the
largest effects were seen among students in states where educational achievement was poorest
prior to adopting the accountability instrument and were far less pronounced in states that
already enjoyed fairly strong test scores even prior to implementing a strong accountability
instrument. Such findings suggest that high-stakes accountability systems are effective for
raising achievement levels for low performing students but have little impact on average or
higher performing students. Therefore, states that had a smaller percentage of low performing
students showed less improvement, principally because the targeted instruction adopted by many
schools in response to the accountability mandates, impacted fewer students. Although such
instruction may have resulted in substantial gains for lower performing students, the instruction
was less effective at increasing student achievement for average and higher performing students,
presumably because it did not help these students improve with regard to the higher-order
thinking skills necessary to answer the more difficult questions on the assessment.

Hanushek

and Raymond's (2004) findings are consistent with the findings of this study in that both suggest
that accountability systems encourage schools to target instruction to low performing students to
the detriment of students at other skills levels.
Finally, as a counter balance, Jacob (2004) made a compelling case that accountability
measures had led to strong improvements in the Chicago public schools. Jacob’s arguments are
a reminder of the lure of accountability and why NCLB was passed in a strongly bipartisan
fashion back in 2001. They also shed light on why, despite numerous problems including those
cited within this study as well as others, accountability retains fairly strong public support. The
data that Jacob presents seems to suggest that a flawed accountability system may be preferable
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to no accountability at all. It should be noted, likewise, that every school in this study met AYP
requirements in 2011. In addition, several of the schools within the high and moderate risk
groups were rated as "Recognized" or "Exemplary" on the Texas AEIS system. However, as by
definition all of these schools have at one time or another been subject to sanctions, many as far
a level three, and yet, those schools have now improved scores sufficiently to meet AYP
requirements despite the fact that these requirements have become more rigorous almost every
year. This in all probability could not have happened without some significant improvement
being made by many of the students at these schools.
However, despite attaining comparable, and in many cases, superior accountability
ratings to schools in the low risk group, schools in the moderate and high risk group lagged
behind schools in the low risk group when it came to the more difficult and challenging items on
the tests. Furthermore, schools in the high risk group also lagged behind the moderate risk
group, though to a less extent. In addition, the data clearly shows that the performance gap
widens the more and more item difficulty increases, strongly suggesting that the instruction at
campuses in the study focuses less and less on higher order thinking skills as accountability risks
increased. The paradox suggested by this data in terms of percentages of students meeting
proficiency requirements and the poor performance of students on the most rigorous of the test
items is what this study sought to resolve. Is outcome-based accountability, to coin a phrase, a
blessing or a curse?
The fact that some students have certainly benefited from the implementation of a strong
accountability system, is consistent with one of the chief arguments in support of NCLB both
before and since its enactment. Especially with regard to the subgroup requirements of the
legislation which for the first time required educators to demonstrate achievement among all
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groups of students. I strongly suspect, however, that not everyone in Chicago has benefited from
strict accountability measures, nor I suspect has every student in the campuses in this study,
despite their escape from accountability sanctions and their admirable state ratings.
Nevertheless, I think it would be foolish to argue that accountability has not positively impacted
many students, especially the very low performing students who may have been “written off,” so
to speak, prior to NCLB, but who have now become a primary focus.
Recommendations for Further Research
1. One of the great challenges of this study was finding a way to isolate the effects of
instructional distortion within the data. Ultimately, the researcher chose to run each of analyses
multiple times isolating and separating student groups so as to avoid the thorny issue of whether
attributes of the student group population (e.g., limited English speakers) were responsible for
the student performance trends in question rather than the accountability pressures associated
with inclusion in an accountability risk group. However, it remains to be determined to what
extent, such distortion, if it is in fact occurring as I believe it does, may impact such groups
differently. For example, a curriculum and instructional approach that focused on minimal skills
and gimmick test taking strategies to answer test questions might not provide students with
limited English abilities the challenging tasks necessary to truly master the language at a level
necessary to succeed in certain professional careers. It would be interesting, in this regard, to
compare such students in this vein against schools from the various risk groups to see if a
significant effect can be isolated.
2. It should be noted that the schools placed within the various risk categories for this
study were not uniformly high or low as to school rankings as one might expect. Rather, as
noted earlier in this chapter, no schools in the study missed AYP the previous year. In fact,
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several schools among the high risk group achieved recognized status, with two being rated
exemplary. One has since been nominated as a Blue Ribbon School. Similarly, although schools
in the low risk group by definition would not have ever received a negative accountability rating
under NCLB or within the past ten years on the state instrument, not all of them were recognized
or exemplary. In fact, several of these schools had remained at the acceptable level for years. In
addition to being an interesting commentary on the differences between the state and federal
accountability system, I believe it raises several questions about how schools approach
instruction. It would be interesting to look at school assessment data through the various ratings
lenses to see how such rankings may have been related to future performance. For example, a
researcher might track the evolution of schools that were rated acceptable versus schools that
may have been relatively similar but missed meeting proficiency requirements by a small margin
or at one grade level or in one subject area. Since districts often implement drastic changes when
schools fail to meet minimum proficiency requirements, it would be interesting to analyze the
disparate paths the previously similar schools may have taken after one school received a
negative accountability rating. A longitudinal analysis of this nature could relate to theories
espoused in this study as to the extent which new strategies or instructional approaches were
effective in remediating deficiencies at the sanctioned school or whether such practices created a
more risk averse relationship as the framework of this study and the results of the analysis
thereof suggest is might.
3. As noted earlier in this chapter, risk associated with failing to meet accountability
requirements under AYP is not static but continues to escalate until schools demonstrate
sufficient improvement to meet these requirements. In fact, schools previously subject to
sanctions must meet all AYP guidelines for two consecutive years before being released entirely
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from sanctions. So, though this study looked at schools in three broad categories of risk, the risk
continuum for campuses under AYP is far more elaborate and can lead eventually to re-staffing
and even closing of a school that continues to fall short of accountability requirements for
several consecutive years. A study that analyzed schools as they progressed through the various
levels of sanctions to determine if the schools, as the theories of Campbell (1979), Simon (1978),
and Laffont and Martimort (2001) suggest, continued to demonstrate increasingly distorted
instructional practice would extend the thesis of this research and provide additional insight into
the impact of accountability systems on instructional practice.
Implications for Practice
1. The implications for practice related to the findings of this study involve serious
ethical challenges that educators face on a daily basis and will continue to face as long as student
achievement on snapshot summative assessments is the metric by which educators are evaluated.
Certainly, the literature cited in this study calls into question not only the accountability
instrument itself, but also the validity of the tests used to apply the system as reliable measures of
student achievement. Having been involved in the testing industry for many years, this is an
especially personal issue for me. I have come to embrace more and more the concept of
formative assessment, discussed in brief in this dissertation.
However, to truly be formative, testing cannot be punitive, as it naturally becomes
whenever scores are disaggregated by school and teacher and reported publicly. When this
happens, and principals and district administration naturally follow with programs to “improve”
such scores, assessment ceases to be formative and devolves instead into a series of mini
summative tests that differ from benchmarks and mock testing only in their length, frequency,
and increased opportunities to feel pressured. The solution to this problem is obvious but
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difficult. Though it is easy for theoreticians such as Stiggins (2005) to preach the perils of
issuing grades and evaluating teacher effectiveness via such tests, it is far more difficult for
school administrators to turn loose of this long time carrot and stick tool. Doing so will require a
thorough understanding of the underlying deficiencies both in the accountability system and the
assessments which inform it. As this study has attempted to show, however, there is more to the
story of student achievement than whether or not a student can be counted in the proficient
category for accountability purposes. In a society that values the individual and his or her
independent pursuit of happiness, it is tragic that educators feel forced to pick and choose where
to focus educational resources based on anything other than what is best for each individual
child. It is my hope that this study and others like it, will encourage educational policymakers
and practitioners alike to refocus our efforts not on numbers and rankings but on learning.
2. I have commented within this dissertation on several occasions about the unlikelihood
that accountability systems will be going away anytime soon. With regards to the Jacob (2004)
study there is certainly some question as to whether it should. Although the NCLB
reauthorization has been stalled in Congress, its mandates continue to operate, other than in those
few places that have so far applied for and been granted a waiver by the Obama administration
pursuant to the president’s recent executive order. Such waivers, however, come with their own
strings and do not release educators from state level accountability mandates, most of which
have continued to operate in a parallel fashion to NCLB.
To that end, if an accountability system is needed, as many including myself believe, it
must be developed in such a way that it avoids many of the traps that we have discovered in the
present systems. For example, it should not set a one-size fits all proficiency bar, but rather
judge school efficacy on student growth. Likewise, such growth cannot be determined by a
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single, annual multiple choice assessment that would then by its very nature become a highstakes test, but should involve portfolio reviews of student work, including assignments,
homework papers, classroom assessments, essays, projects, and other examples of student work
that offer a truly holistic view of the progress a student makes over time, be the student a high or
a low performer.
Such a system, of course, would be very expensive. However, like many accountability
approaches, it would not necessarily have to be applied to all students every year. Schools would
be responsible for keeping such a portfolio for all students, but accountability might be
determined based on a random review of a small percentage of student portfolios. A second
sample could easily be drawn from any schools that showed a pattern of problems in order to
verify that any apparent discrepancies were systemic before imposing mandates for
improvement.
Implications for Policymakers
The No Child Left Behind Act is today noted more for its intricacies than its idealism, but
it should not be lost that the legislation marked the complete ascendancy of an educational
philosophy that had been on the rise since the early years of the Reagan administration and by
which United States policymakers with the support of the public put aside the input-based
strategies and focus that had informed education policy for a quarter of a century in favor of
outcome based education. As has been discussed herein, this was in many respects, a natural
evolution that did encourage schools, many for the first time, to really pay attention to every
student on the campus, and in this respect it is truly impossible to say the law had no positive
effects.
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However, charges that the law has engendered numerous and controversial unintended
consequences, are equally difficult to dispute. This study sought to determine whether evidence
existed that schools were engaging in distorted instructional practices as a result of trying to
comply with the accountability mandates and how this practice might impact students. The
results of the study thereby call into question whether NCLB is in fact helping to close the
educational deficit long observed among disadvantage and limited English students or whether it
is helping to mask continued problems behind a veil of impressive sounding numbers and
statistics.
Although this study was limited in scope and precision, it highlights some of the
underlying problems of using standardized tests as measures of school efficacy. Rothman (2004)
and others have pointed to problems arising when educators try to employ state tests as
synonymous with student learning. The underlying problems are only aggravated when the
instrument exhibits deep flaws and establishes an unrealistic goal. Kim (2003) and others have
pointed to NCLB's 100 percent proficiency threshold as an underlying cause of instructional
distortion. The unintended consequences of policies, though well-meaning, typically
disproportionately impact those individuals and institutions placed most at risk. Given that the
accountability instrument arguably adds to the risk faced by these campuses, policy makers must
pay close attention to the impact
of accountability policies on less privileged populations as well as the impact of policies
designed to address systemic deficiencies deemed to be underlying causes.
Though Alexander (2003) as well as Reschovsky and Imazeki (2001) have rekindled the
input- versus output-based policy debate, holding that lawmakers must do more to address
inequities in the system and level the playing field for all students, I believe it is just as important
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to acknowledge that while steps can be taken to mitigate the differences, such differences will
always exist and should not be ignored or treated as nonexistent.
The underlying purpose of NCLB was to ensure that all students would have access to
high quality schools, but regulatory policy clearly has not facilitated
that change. A decade after its implementation, the fact that government officials are predicting
dramatic increase in numbers of schools failing to meet AYP is illustrative of the need for greater
emphasis on the contextual differences perpetuated between schools and students due in part to
the inequities built into the present system. Simply letting the legislation fade into the twilight
and allowing it to take its place on the scrap heap of bad ideas, will do nothing to solve the issues
that continue to plague public education. Policymakers must find ways to hold educators,
students, and parents alike accountable in a way that is constructive for all, rather than for a
limited cohort chosen consistent with a school's accountability risk. The goal of educating our
children is far too important to accept anything less.
Concluding Remarks
As noted earlier in this dissertation, I have spent a good portion of my professional career
involved in the development of standardized test items for state summative assessments. For
more than a decade, I have worked with some of the largest test publishers in the country, as well
as with state and local officials in several states to create the large scale assessments discussed at
length in this dissertation. It has been an interesting journey to say the least. Therefore, as I
noted earlier, the subject of testing and accountability and their impact on students is a deeply
personal one for me. Obviously, I would not have pursued a career in testing, had I not believed
strongly at the time that these tests and the accountability instruments which they inform were
valuable tools for improving schools. Now, however, although I still believe that testing has its
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place in the educator's tool box, and even that some form of accountability must be retained, I
have over the past several years of personal observation, discussions with colleagues and
professors in my doctoral program, and by talking to teachers, fellow administrators, students,
and parents, come to realize that like the seemingly harmless Mogwals of Gremlins fame,
accountability has devolved into a presence that has now come to overwhelm every thing else in
education.
By the time I entered the doctoral program at U.T. El Paso, I was already beginning to
question many of the underlying assumptions I had carried about accountability for many years.
However, as evidence continued to mount that the charges by teachers of curriculum reduction,
drill and kill mandates, and general testing chaos were in fact more than just the whiney
complains of a few teachers trying to avoid the hard work necessary to educate their students, I
was forced to begin reevaluating my beliefs. As I entered my second year of the doctoral
program, I was holding onto the last rung of support for these policies, where I joined the chorus
of other desperate holdouts singing "nobody forces them to teach to the test." While ostensibly
this may be true, it does not alleviate the damage being done to our students by the application of
this system, regardless of who may be to blame.
I was inspired to pursue this research in part because it took me so long to understand
something that should have been obvious much sooner. As Ravitch and Finn (2007) have noted
apologetically, "we really should have seen this coming" (p. 2). Nevertheless, I remain
convinced that educational policy, as assuredly as it cannot be the panacea for all that ails
education, can neither be the cause of all of its many problems. As educators and professionals,
we are faced every day with choices that are profound in that their impact extends far beyond our
own lives but have long-lasting impact on the lives of our students both in good ways and in bad.
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Therefore, though it will be difficult, we must resist the natural instinct to make such decisions
with our own interests placed above those of our students. It is easy to say we must, but we
must. NCLB is not going away anytime soon. When it does, it will likely be replaced by
another system. As with any system, said future system will no doubt have positives and
negatives. Moving forward, whether working within our present system or someday within a
new one, we must always keep the best interests of our students at the forefront. We must.
Chapter Summary
This chapter began with a description of the context of the study, then briefly reviewed the
study questions and methods employed by the researcher. The chapter next discussed the
theoretical framework as it relates to the study results and described some preliminary
conclusions based on their analyses along with some suggestions for further related research.
The chapter then reviewed the extant literature and its relationship to this study and its findings,
before closing with a description of possible implications for practice and policy, followed with
some final, concluding thoughts.
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